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ESSAY
A PUTRID PEDIGREE: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S
MILITARY TRIBUNALS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
MICHAL R. BELKNAP'
On September 11, 2001, terrorists destroyed the World Trade Center
and badly damaged the Pentagon in the first large-scale attack on American
territory in nearly sixty years.' A week later, the House and Senate adopted a
joint resolution authorizing the President to "[u]se all necessary and appro-
priate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines
planned, authorized, committed or aided" these attacks or "harbored such
organizations or persons."2
On October 7, 2001, the United States commenced aerial bombardment
of Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda organization and its Taliban supporters in
Afghanistan, and less than two weeks later, on the night of October 19-20,
American special operations troops initiated ground operations against the
terrorist organization and its Afghan protectors! Today, for the first time
since it withdrew from Vietnam a generation ago, the United States finds it-
self involved in a protracted war abroad.
" Professor of Law, California Western School of Law, and Adjunct Professor of Ameri-
can History, University of California, San Diego. B.A. (U.C.L.A.), M.A. and Ph.D. (Univer-
sity of Wisconsin, Madison), J.D. (The University of Texas). Professor Belknap is the author
of THE VIETNAM WAR ON TRIAL: THE My LAI MASSACRE AND THE COURT-MARTIAL OF
LIEUTENANT CALL.EY (forthcoming November 2002). He wishes to thank Jason Saccuzzo for
his help with the research for this article and Professors Laurence Benner and William Aceves
for reading and commenting on the manuscript-
1. The United States had experienced nothing comparable to the September 1 I attack
since the Japanese air raid on Pearl Harbor and other targets in Hawaii on December 7. 1941.
A Japanese submarine did attack California on February 23, 1942, surfacing near Santa Bar-
bara and firing a score of shells into a petroleum complex, but this attack inflicted only a few
hundred dollars damage. LEE KENNETr, FOR THE DURATION: THE UNITED STATES GOES TO
WAR - PEARL HARBOR -1942, at 61 (1985). The Japanese had plans to shell a number of West
Coast shore objectives on Christmas Eve, 1941, but the Imperial Navy's Combined Fleet
Headquarters canceled this operation. Id.
2. Authorization for Use of United States Armed Forces, Pub. L. No. 107-40. § 2(a), 115
Stat. 224, 224 (2001).
3. See The White House, President George W. Bush, President Issues Military Order,
Nov. 13, 2001, available at http://whitehouse.gov/news/release/2001/11/20011113-27.himl.
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That war has produced legal reverberations at home.4 Probably the most
controversial of these is President Bush's November 13, 2001 order provid-
ing for the trial before military commissions of aliens suspected of involve-
ment in terrorist activities or membership in al Qaeda or believed to have
knowingly harbored such individuals Spokesmen for the Bush Administra-
tion and defenders of its decision to resort to military justice to fight the le-
gal war on terrorism have offered a number of justifications for that policy.
Vice President Dick Cheney promptly announced that, in his opinion, terror-
ists did not deserve the guarantees and safeguards afforded to defendants by
the civilian judicial system,6 a theme Attorney General John Ashcroft echoed
when he declared: "Foreign terrorists who commit war crimes against the
United States, in my judgment, are not entitled to, and do not deserve, the
protections of the American Constitution. ' 7 Military tribunals, their propo-
nents claimed, would bring these dangerous criminals to justice quickly. "At
a time of warfare, expedition is critical," argued Bruce Fein, once an associ-
ate deputy attorney general in the Reagan administration.' Resort to military
4. E.g., Declaration of National Emergency by Reason of Certain Terrorist Attacks, Proc-
lamation No. 7463, 66 Fed. Reg. 48199 (Sep. 14, 2001); Uniting and Strengthening America
by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA
PATRIOT ACT) of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (authorizing the use of
new intelligence collection techniques and the detention and removal of aliens engaging in
terrorist activities, changing criminal law and procedure relating to terrorism, and facilitating
destruction of the financial infrastructure of terrorism).
5. Military Order-Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War
Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57833 (Nov. 16, 2001) [hereinafter Military Order]. The or-
der defines the class of persons subject to military trial to include "any individual who is not a
United States citizen" with respect to which the President determines in writing that:
(1) there is reason to believe that such individual, at the relevant times,
(i) is or was a member of the organization known as al Quida [sic];
(ii) has engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts of international
terrorism, or acts in preparation therefore, that have caused, threaten to cause, or
have as their aim to cause, injury to or adverse effects on the United States, its citi-
zens, national security, foreign policy or economy; or
(iii) has knowingly harbored one or more individuals described in subparagraphs
(i) or (ii) ....
Id. § 2. On February 8, 2002, the American Bar Association reported: "The use of military
tribunals is one of the most controversial elements in the Administration's response to the ter-
rorist attacks." James Podgers, ABA Tackles Tribunals Issue, 1 A.B.A. J. e-Rcport, Feb. 8,
2002, at http://www.abanet.org/joumal/ereport/f8midtibus.html.
6. Kelly Wallace et al., Bush Officials Defend Military Trials in Terror Cases,
CNN.com, Nov. 14, 2001, available at http://www.cnn.com/200l/LAW/l1/l4/
inv.military.court/.
7. Id.
8. Molly McDonough, Rumsfeld Has Power to Shape Military Tribunals, I ABA J. e-
Report, Nov. 30, 2001, at http://www.abanet.org/journal/ereport/n29court.html. Administra-
tion officials also say Bush's order "is aimed at swiftly bringing terrorists to justice instead of
allowing them to meander through the courts." Rebecca Carr, Critics Attack Bush's Tribunal
Order, Cheney Comes to Defense, Cox News Service, Nov. 15, 2001, available at
[Vol. 38
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tribunals would also prevent reprisals against jurors by supporters of terrorist
defendants, backers of Bush's order insisted.! Furthermore, unlike civilian
trials, these proceedings could be held in secret, making it possible for the
government to avoid disclosing classified information and the methods used
to obtain it.'0 "[F]rankly, you don't want to compromise intelligence infor-
mation in times of war," Ashcroft told NBC's Tom Brokaw." The secrecy of
military trials would also ensure that these proceedings could not become the
sort of political trials in which defendants exploit a courtroom as a forum to
publicize their views and build support for their movement.': Former Solici-
tor General Robert Bork warned readers of National Review, "An open trial
... covered by television, would be an ideal stage for Osama bin Laden to
spread his propaganda to all the Muslims in the world."'3
Despite the advantages that the Bush administration and its supporters
saw in the use of military tribunals, the President's order evoked immediate
and widespread criticism. Leaders of the Arab-American Institute and Peo-
ple for the American Way both condemned it." The American Civil Liber-
ties Union also attacked the President's order.'" Academic critics included a
prominent authority on international war crimes prosecutions,' 6 a Harvard
http://www.coxnews.comlwashingtonbureau/staff/carr/I 11501TER-TRIBUNAL.htm.
9. See Carr, supra note 8; Robert H. Bork, Having Their Day in (a Military) Court, Na-
tional Review, Nov. 30,2001, available at 2001 WL 10667472.
10. See Bork, supra note 9; William Galbeson, Closer Look at New Plan for Trying Ter-
rorists, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 15, 2001, § B6, col. 1, available at 2001 WL 30061792.
11. Ashcroft Defends Military Tribunals: Attorney General Talks with NBC's Tom Bro-
kaw About Decision, Lightspeed (MS/NBC), Nov. 19, 2001, available at http://www.
msnbc.com/news/660191.asp?cpl=I.
12. See generally MICHAL R. BELKNAP, AMiERICAN POLTICAL TRiALS xvii-xviii (2d ed.
1994) [hereinafter BELKNAP, AMMUCAN POLITCALTRIALS].
13. Bork, supra note 9. It is worth noting that, although the September 13, 1993 trial of
the terrorists accused of bombing the World Trade Center on February 26, 1993 lasted six
months, it did not turn into the sort of political spectacle feared by Bork. Anti-Defamation
League Law Enforcement Agency Resource Network, The World Trade Center Bombing,
available at http:/lwww.adl.orgllearn/jtf/wtcbjttf.asp. Nor, my colleague. William Accvcs
reminds me, did that case produce any of the other consequences that proponents of military
tribunals have insisted would result from civilian trials of terrorists.
14. See George Lardner, Jr., On Left and Right, Concern Over Anti-Terrorism Moves,
WASH. PosT, Nov. 16, 2001, at A40, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/articles/A37718-20001 Nov 15.html [hereinafter Lardner, On Left and Right).
15. The ACLU decried Bush's order as "further evidence that the administration is to-
tally unwilling to abide by the checks and balances that are so central to our democracy."
McDonough, supra note 8. The director of its Washington office, Laura W. Murphy, called
the order "disturbing" and expressed the opinion that Bush must "justify why the current sys-
tem does not allow for the timely prosecution of those accused of terrorist activities." Kelly
Wallace, Military Trials Possible for Terror Suspects. CNN.com. Nov. 14. 2001, at
http://cnn.coml2001/US/11/13/inv.military.trials.
16. See Interview by Jennifer Barrett with David Scheffer, Our Credibility is on the Line
Here, NEWsWEEK, Nov. 28, 2001, available at http://www.msnbc.com/news/
664569.asp?cpl=l. See also Jordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: Courting
Illegality, 23 MicH. J. INT'L L. 1 (2001) (international law scholar and expert on My Lai case
contending Bush's order must be amended because substantial portions of it violate intema-
2002]
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constitutional law scholar,'7 another Harvard professor who had formerly
served as a deputy attorney general in the Justice Department, 8 a leader of
the American Bar Association's Criminal Justice Section,' 9 and a legal histo-
rian.20 A professor of international law, Ved P. Nanda of the University of
Denver, characterized Bush's order as "an affront to the rule of law."'" On
Capital Hill, the President's plan to try suspected terrorists before military
commissions drew fire from both the chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, Patrick Leahy (D. Vt.), 22and the chairman of its subcommittee
on the courts, Charles Schumer (D. N.Y.). 23 "President Bush's executive or-
der is a broad proposal that has enormous potential for abuse," Senator Ted
Kennedy (D. Mass.) complained.24
Not all of the criticism came from liberals and the Democratic opposi-
tion. While some prominent members of the President's own party, such as
Senator Orin Hatch (R. Utah), the ranking Republican on the Senate Judici-
ary Committee, supported Bush,25 the impeccably conservative Representa-
tive Robert Barr (R. Ga.), a member of the House Judiciary Committee, de-
cried the Administration's thirst for power and its lack of respect for civil
liberties.26 Tim Lynch, director of the Cato Institute's project on criminal jus-
tice, accused Bush of "arrogance" and his Administration of trying to take
presidential power "farther than it has gone before., 27 Even the Heritage
Foundation warned the Administration to proceed with caution.8
Newspapers across the country carried denunciations of the Administra-
tion's plan to try terrorists before military commissions. "It is a good sign for
tional law).
17. See Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Fury, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 28, 2002, at 4.
18. Henry Weinstein, Daren Briscoe, & Mitchell Landsberg, A Changed America: Civil
Liberties Take Back Seat to Safety Law: Some Hard-Won Freedoms Give Way to More Police
Powers and Self-Censorship, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2002, at A31, col. 2. Although strongly
supporting most of what the Bush Administration has done in the war on terrorism. Professor
Phillip B. Heymann says of its plans to utilize military tribunals: "I think they must have gone
absolutely crazy." In his opinion, the President's order shows that he "deeply misunderstands
what the U.S. is about." Id.
19. See comments by Professor Stephen Allan Saltzburg of the George Washington Uni-
versity School of Law, quoted in McDonough, supra note 8.
20. Michal R. Belknap, Military Tribunals: Legal but Dubious, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIBUNE, Nov. 25, 2001, at G5.
21. Ved P. Nanda, Let U.N. Tribunal Try Terrorists, DENVER POST, Nov. 25, 2001,
available at 2001 WL 27672488.
22. See Lardner, On Left and Right, supra note 14.
23. See Stephen Dinan & Jerry Seper, Schumer to Probe Order for Tribunals,
WASHINGTON TvIMES, Nov. 28, 2001, at Part A, Nation, A6.
24. Kevin Freking, Ashcroft: Tribunal Critics Aid Terrorists, ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT-
GAZETTE, Dec. 7, 2001, at Al.
25. Id.
26. Lardner, On Left and Right, supra note 14.
27. Id.
28. Morton H. Halperin, Stockade Justice: Why We Don't Need Military Tribunals,
AMERICAN PROSPECT, Nov. 17, 2001, available at 2001 WL 7681338.
[Vol. 38
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American democracy that voices are being raised against President Bush's
attempt to scuttle due process by sending foreign terrorist suspects to mili-
tary tribunals," the Boston Globe editorialized. Writing in the Cornell Daily
Sun, two college students excoriated the President's plan as "a Bad Idea for
America-and Racist too."3 Noting that Timothy McVeigh, the domestic
terrorist who blew up a federal building in Oklahoma City, had been tried
"in a regular court of law," the Greensboro (North Carolina) News and Re-
cord asked, "Why in the world do they need to use military tribunals [to try
non-citizens accused of terrorism]?"'" The News and Record suspected "the
real reason for this action is that the government wants to make sure it con-
victs these men, whether they are truly guilty or not . . ."' Writing in The
(Bergen County) Record, Kevin Lantry of Ridgewood, New Jersey argued
that the type of trials Bush had authorized would serve only to strengthen
America's enemies by enabling them to portray themselves as martyrs.'
"Rarely, but inevitably, there comes a time when the American people must
tell a president 'enough,"' Charles Levendosky, of the Casper (Wyoming)
Star-Tribune, declared in a piece he wrote for the Milwaukee Journal-
Sentinel. "That time is now."'
Although vigorously condemned by Levendosky and an array of other
highly vocal critics, the President's scheme appeared to enjoy overwhelming
public support. A poll conducted for Newsweek magazine discovered,
"Americans are solidly behind the Bush Administration's plan to try terror-
ists in military tribunals."3 Pollsters found that sixty-eight percent of them
approved of it, while only twenty-two percent disapproved.' Although those
numbers must have cheered Bush and his backers, pollsters also discovered
that the public's ideas about how military tribunals should operate differed
substantially from those of the Administration." Thirty percent thought the
proceedings should be conducted entirely in public, and another twenty-eight
percent believed they should be mostly public. Fifty-five percent of those
29. The Tribunal Fallacy, THE BOSTON GLOBE. Dec. 1, 2001, available at 2001 WL
31229903.
30. Jordan Erenrich & Adam Crouch, Why Military Tribunals are a Bad Idea, CONmI.L
DAILY SUN, Dec. 3,2001, available at http://www.cornelldailysun.com/articles/4098/.
31. Military Tribunals Cannot be Justified, NEWS & RECORD (Greensboro. NC), Dec. 22,
2001, at A12.
32. Id.
33. Kevin Lantry, Secret Trials are a Bad Idea, THE REcORD, Nov. 20. 2001, at L12,
available at 2001 WL 5278531.
34. Charles Levendosky, Are Military Tribunals Appropriate? No, They Shred the Con-
stitution, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL-SENTINEL, Nov. 24, 2001, at 15A, available at 2001 WL
27436639.
35. Jennifer Barrett, Newsweek Poll: Public Backs Military Tribunals, Dec. 1. 2001.
available at http://www.msnbc.com/news/666040.asp?cp 1=1.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id Twenty-seven percent of those interviewed thought military tribunal trials should
be mostly in secret, while eleven percent thought they should be entirely secret. Id.
2002]
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surveyed believed the tribunals should have some international involvement,
while only forty percent agreed with the Bush Administration that they
should be run entirely by Americans.39 An overwhelming seventy-four per-
cent majority said military commissions should be used to try foreign sus-
pects captured elsewhere in the world, but fifty-seven percent opposed using
them to try non-citizens who had lived in this country for many years."0 In-
deed, a very substantial minority (forty-two percent) did not even want the
commissions to consist entirely of military personnel, expressing the opinion
that civilian federal judges should play some role in their proceedings."'
Ominously, fifty-nine percent of those interviewed considered it somewhat
likely that the government would overuse military tribunals in cases involv-
ing non-citizens that belonged in the regular criminal court system, while
another eighteen percent considered this highly likely."2
The widespread criticism that Bush's plan evoked and the public's sub-
stantial reservations about it caused the Administration to back away from
what the President had authorized on November 13. The draft rules for mili-
tary tribunals that were leaked to the press in December 2001 were signifi-
cantly more protective of defendants' rights than his order required. 3 Fur-
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. In mid-January 2002, USA Today reported that lawyers in the office of the general
counsel at the Defense Department, who were drafting rules for the military tribunals, were
considering a plan to allow alleged terrorists convicted by these commissions to appeal their
convictions to a panel of state and federal judges who were also military reservists. See Toni
Locy, Reservist Judges Could Hear Terror Appeals, USA TODAY, Jan. 11, 2002, at 8A, avail-
able at 2002 WL 4717107.
42. Id. Twelve percent thought it not at all likely this would occur, and twenty-five per-
cent considered it "not too likely." Id.
43. See Toward Fairness, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 3, 2002, at B6, available at
2002 WL 25382. These draft rules granted the accused terrorists the presumption of inno-
cence, required proof beyond a reasonable doubt, allowed defendants to hire their own law-
yers, opened most of the proceedings to the public, and required a unanimous vote to impose
the death penalty. Id. The President's November 13 order did none of these things. It failed to
mention the presumption of innocence or the traditional Anglo-American requirement of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The President's order at least implied that accused alien ter-
rorists might have to accept counsel designated by the Secretary of Defense. See Military Or-
der, supra note 5, § 4(c)(5). It authorized the Secretary of Defense to provide for closure of
the proceedings of a military tribunal. Id. § 4(c)(4). It also clearly allowed the death penalty to
be imposed by a two-thirds vote of the members of the commission. See id. §§ 4(a) and
4(c)(7).
The final version of the rules, issued by the Department of Defense on March 21, 2002,
did in fact embody the protections leaked earlier. See Department of Defense, Military
Commission Order No. 1 (Mar. 21, 2002) (copy on file with the author) [hereinafter Depart-
ment of Defense]. The rules provide: "The Accused shall be presumed innocent until proven
guilty." Id. § 5(B). A member of a Commission may vote to convict of an offense "if and
only if that member is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, based on the evidence admitted
at trial, that the Accused is guilty of the offense." Id. § 6(F). A unanimous vote of a Commis-
sion is required to impose a death sentence. Id. The accused is allowed to retain, at his own
expense, the services of a civilian attorney. This right is, however, subject to a number of
qualifications, including the fact that the lawyer selected must be "eligible for access to in-
[Vol. 38
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thermore, when the government prosecuted the first alien accused of terrorist
activities after the order was issued, it brought the case in a civilian court,
rather than before a military commission." Officials acknowledged that re-
cent criticism of military tribunals had helped shape that decision.'
Despite the fact that the Bush Administration seemed to be backing
away from the position the President had staked out on November 13, at its
February 2002 Midyear Meeting, the American Bar Association weighed in
on the issue of military tribunals." Following an impassioned debate,' the
ABA's House of Delegates adopted by a vote of 286-147 a resolution urging
that these special commissions not be used to try alleged violations of the
laws of war by U.S. citizens, lawful resident aliens, or other aliens who were
in the United States legally.' The ABA also called upon the Department of
formation classified at the level of SECRET or higher" and that he or she must never have
been subjected to any sanction or disciplinary action "by any court, bar, or other competent
governmental authority for relevant misconduct." let § 4(C)(3)(b). The rules provide that the
accused "shall be afforded a trial open to the public." Id. § 5(0). Again, however, this right is
subject to numerous qualifications, the most important of which is that "[t]he Presiding Offi-
cer may decide to close all or part of a proceeding on the Presiding Officer's own initia-
tive ..... Id. § 6(B)(3).
44. On December 11, 2001, the government indicted Zacarias Moussaoui for conspiring
with Osama bin Laden and other members of al Qaeda (including the nineteen men who hi-
jacked the airliners that crashed into the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and a Pennsyl-
vania field on September 11) to murder thousands of innocent Americans. David Johnston &
Philip Shenon, Man Held Since August is Accused of Helping in Sept. 11 Terror Plot. N.Y.
Tim, Dec. 12, 2001, at A-1, col. 2. Under the President's order Moussaoui could have been
tried before a military tribunal, for he was a French citizen of Moroccan descenL "Admini-
stration officials said the decision to prosecute Mr. Moussaoui in federal court followed a
contentious debate between the Pentagon, which wanted to try him in an overseas military
tribunal, and the Justice Department, which has secured convictions in several important ter-
rorist cases in American courts." Id. According to the White House, the decision to indict
Moussaoui came after Attorney General Ashcroft met with President Bush. According to
Press Secretary Ari Fleischer, the Attorney General recommended that the cases be heard in a
civilian criminal court, and the President concurred. Id. at B-7, cols. 2-3.
In the opinion of Elisa Massimino of the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights: "The
Moussaoui indictment makes it hard to imagine a case that could justify the use of military
courts inside the United States." Alien Justice: What's Wrong with Military Trials of Terrorist
Suspects?, 25 HUM. RTs. 14, 14 (2002).
45. Johnston & Shenon, supra note 44, at A-1, col. 2. Rich Lowry of National Review
maintained that the forthcoming civilian trial of Moussaoui in Alexandria. Virginia could
"best be thought of as Patrick Leahy's revenge-the fruit of the Democrats' assault on the
idea of military tribunals. Show Trial, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLIN, Jan. 4, 2002, available at
http://www.nationalreview.com/ lowry/lowryO10402.shtml.
46. A few weeks earlier, its Task Force on Terrorism and the Law had issued a report
endorsing the use of military tribunals with some restrictions. Podgers, supra note 5.
47. Id. One of the participants in the debate was Solicitor General Theodore Olson.
whose wife (a passenger on the plane that hit the Pentagon) was one of the victims of the Sep-
tember 11 attacks. "We are still learning about the enemy we are facing," said Olson. "Unless
we're sure this resolution won't have unintended consequences for those efforts, we shouldn't
put it forth as the definitive [ABA] statement on the issue." d ABA President-elect Alfred P.
Carlton, Jr. of Raleigh, North Carolina took a similar position. "We need to leave some flexi-
bility," he said. I.
48. id. The House of Delegates also adopted another resolution generally supporting
20021
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Defense to require that military tribunals observe fair trial standards. 9 Ap-
parently chastened, it did so. The rules governing-the operation of the tribu-
nals that the Pentagon released on March 21, 20020 closely matched the rec-
ommendations of the ABA.5' Although taking issue with a few of them,
which he felt needed more work, the organization's president, Robert Hir-
shon, declared, "This is a giant step forward, and it's a positive step."'
The Bush Administration, which had gone along with the ABA, after
trying unsuccessfully to persuade the House of Delegates to delay action on
the tribunals issue," had obviously underestimated the apprehension that its
plan would arouse among lawyers as well as laypersons. Had the President
and his advisors paid more attention to the unsavory history of American
military commissions, they might have anticipated the furor that the Presi-
dent's November 13 order evoked. That history is the focus of this Essay. It
concedes that the sort of military tribunals the President has authorized are
probably not unlawful, at least when used to try certain kinds of offenses
committed in certain places. They may even represent an appropriate method
of prosecuting terrorists apprehended outside the United States for war
crimes committed in other countries. It is my contention, however, that the
many abuses and injustices associated with past military commission trials
suggest that utilizing this device to try individuals for crimes committed
within the United States would be unwise.
In Part I, I discuss the legality of Bush's order, examining Supreme
Court decisions which suggest that while military tribunals are constitu-
tional, certain details of the President's plan are not. Part II deals with the
use of military commissions to prosecute war crimes committed abroad.
Noting that there are historical precedents for employing them for that pur-
pose, it concedes that in this context, resort to military tribunals may be ap-
propriate, but warns that such proceedings can easily tarnish the image of
American justice. Part III discusses the use of military commissions to try
offenses committed within the United States. Taking a close look at a series
President Bush in his war on terrorism. Id.
49. Id. House of Delegates member Brooksley E. Born of Washington, D.C. declared,
'This is where the legal profession needs to be heard-on the importance of these core val-
ues." Id. The resolution that the House of Delegates adopted urged that Defense Department
regulations governing the operation of these tribunals incorporate procedures and guidelines
contained in the Uniform Code of Military Justice [which are followed in courts-martial of
American military personnel] and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Id.
The ABA's Section on Individual Rights and Responsibilities joined several local bar associa-
tions in co-sponsoring the resolution. Id.
50. See Department of Defense, supra note 43.
51. Molly McDonough, Pentagon Releases Rules on Tribunals, I A.B.A. J. c-Report,
Mar. 22, 2002, available at http://www.abanet.org/journal/ereport/m22trib.html.
52. Id.
53. Podgers, supra note 5. According to ABA President Robert E. Hirshon, a high-
ranking Justice Department official contacted Robert A. Clifford, chair of the organization's
Task Force on Terrorism and the Law, urging that the House of Delegates delay action on the
issue. Id.
[Vol. 38
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of notorious trials between 1862 and 1942, Part I shows that they were rife
with procedural irregularities and substantive injustice. The history of these
proceedings, I suggest, raises grave doubts about the wisdom of the Bush
Administration's plans to employ military commissions to combat terrorism
at home.
I. LEGALITY OF PRESIDENT BUSH'S ORDER
Foolishness is not synonymous with illegality, and while the issue is
certainly debatable,' President Bush probably does possess the authority to
create the kind of courts for which his November 13 order provides. The rea-
son is not that Congress gave it to him. The statutory basis for military
commissions is so thin as to be almost invisible. The Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice (UCMJ),' enacted by Congress in 1950,' does little more than
acknowledge the existence of such tribunals. It has only a tiny bit to say
about the power of military commissions and neither confers jurisdiction on
them nor prescribes the manner of their operation."
While the lack of any real statutory foundation for these tribunals may
be a political problem for the Administration, it probably does not affect the
54. See David B. Rivkin, Jr. et al., Bringing AI-Qaeda to Justice: The Constitutionality of
Trying Al-Qaeda Terrorists in the Military Justice System, HERITAGE FOUNDATION. Nov. 5.
2001, available at http://www.heritage.org/library/legalmemo/Im3.html.
55. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-950 (Supp. 2001).
56. Pub. L. 81-506, 64 Stat. 107 (1950).
57. Art 21 of the UCMJ provides:
The provisions of this chapter conferring jurisdiction upon courts-martial do not
deprive military commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals of concur-
rent jurisdiction with respect to offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law
of war may be tried by military commissions, provost courts, or other military tri-
bunals.
10 U.S.C. § 821 (2002) (emphasis added). Art. 104 of the UCMJ, which deals with the pun-
ishments for aiding the enemy, also mentions military commissions. It provides:
Any person who:
(1) aids, or attempts to aid, the enemy with arms, ammunition, supplies, money, or
other things; or
(2) without proper authority, knowingly harbors or protects or gives intelligence
to, or communicates or corresponds with or holds any intercourse with the enemy.
either directly or indirectly;
shall suffer death or such other punishment as a court-martial or military commis-
sion may direct.
18 U.S.C. § 904 (2002) (emphasis added). Art. 36 leaves it to the President to prescribe the
rules of procedure to be followed in "military commissions and other military tribunals ..."
10 U.S.C. § 836 (2002). Also relevant is Art. 2, which includes among those made subject to
the UCMJ, "prisoners of war in custody of the armed forces." 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(9) (2002).
This article does not, however, refer at all to military commissions.
2002]
9
Belknap: ESSAY: A Putrid Pedigree: The Bush Administration's Military Trib
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2001
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
legality of Bush's November 13 directive. His Military Order refers to sev-
eral statutes, but in issuing it, he seems to have relied primarily on the inher-
ent powers of his office, especially his authority as Commander-in-Chief of
the armed forces. 8 The Commander-in-Chief clause does not empower the
President to subject anyone he suspects of terrorist activity to a military trial.
Such a sweeping order would run afoul of Ex parte Milligan (1867).19 In that
case, the Supreme Court granted a writ of habeas corpus to an Indiana man
who had been convicted by a military commission of treason, allegedly
committed during the Civil War.' It held that trying a citizen who was not a
member of the armed forces before such a tribunal, rather than in a civilian
federal court authorized by Congress, in an area where such courts were
open and satisfactorily administering criminal justice, violated both the Sixth
Amendment's guarantee of a speedy and public trial before an impartial jury
and the Fifth Amendment's requirement that all prosecutions not involving
members of the military be initiated by grand jury indictment.6 ' The Court
rejected the contention that the emergency created by a war justified using
military commissions in areas not within a theater of operations.62
58. The preamble of the November 13, 2001 Military Order declares:
By the authority vested in me as President and as Commander in Chief of the
Armed Forces of the United States by the Constitution and the laws of the United
States of America, including the Authorization for Use of Military Force Joint
Resolution (Public Law 107-40, 115 Stat 224) and sections 821 and 836 of title 10
United States Code, it is hereby ordered as follows....
Military Order, supra note 5. Jordan Paust contends that there are significant limitations on
the President's authority to set up military commissions pursuant to his Commander-in-Chief
power: "The President's Commander-in-Chief power to set up military commissions applies
only during actual war within a war zone or relevant occupied territory and apparently ends
when peace is finalized." Paust, supra note 16, at 5.
59. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1867).
60. In fact, although convicted of treason, Milligan and those tried with him almost cer-
tainly were not guilty of that offense. The defendants, all of whom were Democrats, were the
victims of a highly political prosecution, initiated by the Republican governor of Indiana for
partisan purposes. See notes 167-98 and accompanying text infra. See generally Frank L. Kle-
ment, The Indianapolis Treason Trials and Ex Parte Milligan, in BELKNAP, AMERICAN
POLITICAL TRIALS, supra note 12, at 99-118.
61. 71 U.S. at 210-14. Cf Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946). While Duncan
also held unlawful the use of military tribunals to try individuals charged with a crime who
were not connected with the armed forces, the legal basis of that decision was different from
the legal basis of Milligan. Taking the position that it was unnecessary to address the constitu-
tionality of the military tribunals whose jurisdiction was challenged in that case, id. at 312-13,
the Supreme Court held that the statute under which the government of the then-Territory of
Hawaii operated, the Hawaiian Organic Act, did not authorize the military to try and punish
civilians. Id. at 324. In a concurring opinion in Duncan, Justice Frank Murphy emphasized
that, "[a]bhorrence of military rule is ingrained in our form of government," id. at 325, and
insisted that there should be no retreat from Milligan's open court rule. Id. at 334.
62. See 71 U.S. at 209-10, 215-22. In what is probably the most famous passage in its
Milligan opinion, the Court declared:
The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in war
and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all
442 [Vol. 38
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On the other hand, the Supreme Court has endorsed the use of such tri-
bunals to try foreign military personnel in places where there has been actual
combat.6 In In re Yamashita,6' it refused to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a
Japanese general who had been convicted by a military commission, which
was convened by the commanding general of U.S. armed forces in the West-
ern Pacific for the transgressions of his troops during the final stages of
World War II in the Philippines. The Court asserted that,
[a]n important incident to the conduct of war is the adoption of
measures by the military commander, not only to repel and defeat
the enemy, but to seize and subject to disciplinary measures those
enemies who, in their attempt to thwart or impede our military ef-
fort, have violated the law of war.'
Four years later, in Johnson v. Eisentrager (1950)," it affirmed the ac-
tion of a federal district court that had dismissed habeas corpus petitions
filed by former German soldiers convicted by a military commission of con-
tinuing to engage in belligerent activity against U.S. forces in China after the
times and under all circumstances. No doctrine, involving more pernicious conse-
quences, was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be
suspended during any of the great exigencies of government.
Id at 209.
63. For a fuller discussion of military commission trials of this type, see Part 11 infra.
64. 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
65. It at 11. It should be noted that the Court believed that Congress had authorized the
trial and punishment of enemy combatants for violation of the laws of war. Id. The laws of
war proscribe conduct that is considered criminal even when committed within the context of
a war, as the simple killing and wounding of others is not, although it would be in peacetime.
See TELFORD TAYLOR, NUREMBERG AND VIETNAM: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY 19 (1970).
What then are the 'laws of war'? They are of ancient origin, and followed two
main streams of development. The first flowed from medieval notions of chiv-
alry.... [tli survives today in rules (often violated) prohibiting various deceptions
such as the use of the enemy's uniforms or battle insignia, or the launching of a
war without fair warning by formal declaration.
The second and far more important concept is that the ravages of war should be
mitigated as far as possible by prohibiting needless cruelties, and other acts that
spread death and destruction and are not reasonably related to the conduct of hos-
tilities. The seeds of such a principle must be nearly as old as human society, and
ancient literature abounds with condemnation of pillage and massacre. In more re-
cent times, both religious humanitarianism and the opposition of merchants to un-
necessary disruptions of commerce have furnished the motivation for restricting
customs and understandings. In the 17th century, these laws began to find expres-
sion in learned writings, especially those of the Dutch jurist-philosopher Hugo
Grotius.
The formalization of military organization in the 18th century brought the es-
tablishment of military courts empowered to try violations of the laws of war as
well as other offenses by soldiers.
Id. at 19-20.
66. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
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May 8, 1945 surrender of Germany to the Allies. "The jurisdiction of mili-
tary authorities, during or following hostilities, to punish those guilty of of-
fenses against the laws of war is long-established," the Court maintained.67 It
characterized as "well-established" the power of the military to exercise ju-
risdiction over "enemy belligerents, prisoners of war, or others charged with
violating the laws of war."'68
While the petitioners in Yamashita and Eisentrager committed their
crimes in overseas theaters of operation, those in Ex parte Quirin (1942)69
were tried by a military commission for World War II offenses committed
within the United States. They had come to this country from Germany on a
sabotage mission."0 After landing in two groups, one in Florida and the other
on Long Island, the so-called "Nazi saboteurs" disposed of their military uni-
forms," thus forfeiting the right to be treated as prisoners of war.7" President
Roosevelt ordered them tried before a military commission in Washington,
D.C., although the civil courts there were open and functioning." Arguing
that, since their clients were not members of the American armed forces, un-
der Ex parte Milligan, they were entitled to a civilian trial, the appointed
counsel representing the Nazi saboteurs petitioned for a writ of habeas cor-
pus and carried their case quickly up to the Supreme Court." It rejected their
67. Id. at 786. As in Yamashita, the Court was not ruling here on the authority of the
President to create military commissions to try enemy belligerents. It was instead commenting
on the legality, under international law, of punishing enemy military personnel for war
crimes. Id.
68. Id. (quoting Duncan, 327 U.S. at 312, 313-14).
69. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
70. See generally EUGENE RACHLIS, THEY CAME TO KILL (1961) (popular account of the
misadventures of the Nazi saboteurs); George Lardner, Jr., Nazi Saboteurs Captured! FDR
Orders Secret Military Tribunal, WASH. POST MAG., Jan. 13, 2002, at W12 [hereinafter Lard-
ner, Nazi Saboteurs Captured] (recent journalistic account which draws on scholarship on the
case, including work by this Author).
71. See David J. Danelski, The Saboteurs' Case, J. SU'. CT. HIST. Soc'Y 61, 63-64
(1996).
72. Geneva Convention Related to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, opened for signa-
ture Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, Art. 4A(l), (3), Art. 5, Art. 13. Art. 25.
Art. 82, Art. 84, Art. 105, available at 1956 WL 54809 (U.S. Treaty).
73. Danelski, supra note 71, at 65-66. He did so primarily because he wanted the defen-
dants to be given the death penalty, and had they been convicted in a civilian court on the
most obvious charge, attempted sabotage, the maximum sentence they could have received
was thirty years in prison. Michal R. Belknap, The Supreme Court Goes to War: The Mean-
ing and Implications of the Nazi Saboteur Case, 89 MIL. L. REv. 59, 63 (1980) [hereinafter
Belknap, Supreme Court].
74. See Belknap, Supreme Court, supra note 73, at 67-73. The defendants were repre-
sented by Colonel Cassius M. Dowell, a career Judge Advocate General's Corps officer, and
Kenneth Royall, a wartime volunteer with a distinguished record as a trial lawyer in North
Carolina. Id. at 67. Dowell and Royall challenged not only the constitutionality of the military
trial but also what they contended was the failure of the presidential proclamation creating it
to comply with several procedural provisions of the Articles of War. Id. at 68. See generally
Boris I. Bittker, The World War II German Saboteurs' Case and Writs of Certiorari Before
Judgment by the Court of Appeals: A Tale of Nunc Pro Tunc Jurisdiction, 14 CONST.
COMMENT. 431 (1997) (discussing the procedural aspects of the case from the perspective of a
[Vol. 38
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argument.75 Noting that Milligan had been a non-belligerent, who was nei-
ther part of nor associated with the armed forces of the enemy, the Court
maintained that its opinion in his case was inapplicable to this one."6 Because
these petitioners had passed military lines out of uniform for purposes of
committing sabotage, they were unlawful belligerents." As such, a military
commission could constitutionally try them for violation of the laws of war.
The Court proclaimed, "We have no occasion now to define with meticulous
care the ultimate boundaries of the jurisdiction of military tribunals to try
persons according to the law of war. It is enough that petitioners here, upon
the conceded facts, were plainly within those boundaries."7'
Thus, to the extent that what President Bush has authorized is military
trials of non-citizens for war crimes committed abroad and of alien terrorists
for acts of unlawful belligerency committed within the United States, his
November 13 order has the support of Supreme Court precedent." To be
sure, one facet of it is probably unconstitutional. Bush proclaimed that "mili-
tary tribunals shall have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to offenses"
committed by the individuals to whom his Military Order applies, and that
those individuals "shall not be privileged to seek any remedy or maintain
any proceeding, directly or indirectly, or to have any such remedy or pro-
ceeding sought on the individual's behalf, in ... any court of the United
States. .. ."' This provision replicates one Franklin Roosevelt included in
his 1942 proclamation setting up the commission that tried the Nazi sabo-
teurs, and its purpose, like that of its model, seems to be to prevent those
subjected to trial by military commissions from challenging those tribunals
by petitioning civilian courts for writs of habeas corpus." In Quirin, the gov-
junior attorney who participated in it).
75. See Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 45.
76. Id.
77. Id at 31.
78. ld. at 45-46.
79. Whether the Quirin precedent would support the use of a military commission to try
a citizen accused of acts of unlawful belligerency is highly problematic. One of the petitioners
in that case, Hans Haupt, had immigrated to the United States when he was five, and his at-
torneys contended he had become a United States citizen when his parents were naturalized
while he was still a minor. See 317 U.S. at 20. Haupt was recruited for the sabotage mission
after finding himself in Germany at the end of an ill-fated odyssey that began when he fled
Chicago for Mexico after impregnating his girlfriend. Royall insisted that Haupt had never
taken an oath of allegiance to Germany, joined the German army or the Nazi party, or in any
other way renounced his United States citizenship, and hence he remained a United States
citizen. See Belknap, Supreme Court, supra note 73, at 85, 71. Since the Supreme Court de-
clined to resolve the issue of Haupt's citizenship status (317 U.S. at 20), it is possible to argue
either that Quirin does or that it does not stand for the proposition that a United States citizen
who has acted as an unlawful belligerent can be tried before a military commission.
80. Military Order, supra note 5, § 7(b)(2).
81. Attorney General Francis Biddle told Roosevelt that this portion of his proclamation
would produce the same practical results in the saboteur case as suspending the writ of habeas
corpus without raising the broad policy questions that would follow a suspension of the writ.
Belknap, Supreme Court, supra note 73, at 65. Bush's Military Order actually creates a more
2002]
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emiment contended that Roosevelt's proclamation precluded any court from
granting the saboteurs a hearing, even on the issue of whether his decree ap-
plied to their case. Bending over backwards to avoid conflict with the Presi-
dent, the Supreme Court denied that his directive had that effect, then went
on to assert that "neither the Proclamation nor the fact that they are enemy
aliens forecloses consideration by the courts of petitioners' contentions that
the Constitution and laws of the United States constitutionally enacted forbid
their trial by military commission."82 In Yamashita, while affirming that
Congress had given civilian judges no authority to review the determinations
of such tribunals, the Court noted that there was one exception: it had
authorized them to grant writs of habeas corpus for the purpose of inquiring
into the causes of restraints of liberty.83 "If the military tribunals have lawful
authority to hear, decide and condemn, their action is not subject to judicial
review merely because they have made a wrong decision on disputed facts,"
it acknowledged." But civilian courts might "inquire into whether the deten-
tion complained of is within the authority of those detaining the petitioner."85
Although the Supreme Court carefully avoided in Quirin and Yamashita
both confrontation with the Executive and the articulation of a precise con-
stitutional rule, the message of those decisions is clear: the President may
not (at least without suspending the Great Writ) deny those he subjects to
trial by military commission access to the civilian courts via habeas corpus.
The Court's recent decision in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. St.
Cyr86 makes even more dubious Bush's attempt to do this without explicitly
impregnable barrier to civilian judicial review than did its model, for Roosevelt's proclama-
tion forbade those to whom it applied to "seek any remedy or maintain any proceeding" in the
courts of the United States, except as authorized by the Attorney General or the Secretary of
War. Id.
Habeas corpus is the only possible way of obtaining civilian judicial review of a convic-
tion returned by a military commission or a sentence imposed by one of these tribunals. An
American serviceman convicted by a court-martial can appeal his conviction to a military ap-
pellate court, called the Court of Criminal Appeals, then to the civilian capstone of the mili-
tary legal system, the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, and finally (if it
grants him a writ of certiorari), to the U.S. Supreme Court. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 866(b), 867,
867a (Supp. 2001). However, the provision in the UCMJ which confers jurisdiction on the
Courts of Criminal Appeals does not mention military commissions, providing only that the
Judge Advocate General shall refer to these courts "the record in each case of trial by court-
martial .. " 10 U.S.C. § 866(b) (Supp. 2001). Consequently, there is no way to bring a case
that originates in a military commission before a Court of Criminal Appeals, and thus no way
to get it into the appellate system that leads on to the civilian Court of Appeals for the Armed
Forces and the civilian Supreme Court.
82. 317 U.S. at 9.
83. 327 U.S. at 8.
84. Id.
85. Id. Cf. Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 200 (1948) (Douglas, J., concurring) (a
U.S. District Court has jurisdiction to entertain a petition for habeas corpus filed by a foreign
national convicted by an international military tribunal convened by the United States and
other countries).
86. 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
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saying so.' Although attempting to insulate his military tribunals from all
oversight by the civilian federal judiciary is at best constitutionally question-
able," those tribunals themselves, at least if used to try only unlawful bellig-
erents and foreigners accused of war crimes abroad, really are not.
II. USE OF MILITARY COMMISSIONS TO TRY TERRORISTS APPREHENDED
ABROAD FOR CRIMES COMMITTED OVERSEAS
The use of such tribunals to try terrorists apprehended outside the
United States for war crimes committed in other countries, such as Afghani-
stan, makes a good deal of sense. It is certainly not an unavoidable necessity,
for general courts-martial appear to have the authority to hear all such
cases,9 and Congress has given the civilian federal courts jurisdiction in a
large percentage of those that might arise.' Military commissions, however,
have been employed for similar purposes in the past. The first use of some-
thing comparable to what President Bush has authorized following the adop-
tion and ratification of the Constitution occurred during the Mexican War.9
87. In St. Cyr, the Court, interpreting a statute in such a way as to avoid the problem,
asserted that Congress could not preclude judicial consideration on habeas corpus of an im-
portant question of law without making "a clear, unambiguous, and express statement" of its
intent to do so. Id. at 314. If the same rule applies to the Executive, Bush's Military Order,
which does not even explicitly mention habeas corpus, falls far short of satisfying it.
88. Anthony D'Amato, a professor of international law at Northwestern University and a
former defense attorney at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia at
The Hague, says of the section of the Military Order that attempts to deny defendants the op-
portunity to raise the issue of the illegality of the proceedings as a collateral matter in the ci-
vilian U.S. courts, "This is so bad to me that it sounds unconstitutional." McDonough, supra
note 8.
89. See Michael A. Newton, Continuum Crimes: Military Jurisdiction over Foreign Na-
tionals Who Commit International Crimes, 153 MIL L. REv. 1. 4 (1996). Art. 18 of the
UCMJ provides that general courts-martial "have jurisdiction to try any person who by the
law of war is subject to trial by a military tribunal and may adjudge any punishment permitted
by the law of war." 10 U.S.C. § 818 (Supp. 2001).
90. 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2001) makes punishable "a war crime" committed either inside or
outside the United States, provided that either the perpetrator or the victim is a member of the
American armed forces or that either is a U.S. national. There are other statutes that would
also provide a basis for punishing certain kinds of war crimes in the civilian federal courts.
For example, 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (2001) gives these courts jurisdiction in cases of torture
committed outside the United States, regardless of whether the perpetrator or victim is a U.S.
national. Another statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1203, provides similar jurisdiction for acts of hostage
taking. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has affirmed
a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1203. See United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir.
1991).
91. Andrew Curry reports that "there are a few famous cases of British agents brought up
before military tribunals during the Revolutionary War .. " Andrew Curry. Liberty and Jus-
tice: Military Tribunals in America: A Controversial Tool with a Storied Past, U.S. NEWs &
WoRLD REP., Dec. 10, 2001, at 52, 53. President Franklin Roosevelt considered one of these,
the case of Major John Andrd (the British officer apprehended out of uniform and in disguise
and subsequently executed as a spy for receiving papers concerning the fortifications at West
Point from the American traitor, Benedict Arnold) an "absolute parallel" to the World War II
Nazi saboteur case. Danelski, supra note 71, at 65. However, Andrd was not tried by a mili-
15
Belknap: ESSAY: A Putrid Pedigree: The Bush Administration's Military Trib
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2001
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
After invading central Mexico, General Winfield Scott declared martial law
and, without any sort of congressional authorization, issued a general order
providing that certain crimes against American soldiers committed by Mexi-
can civilians (including murder, malicious stabbing and maiming, and mali-
cious assault and battery, robbery, and theft) should be punished by military
commissions. Scott also prescribed their use to try members of his own army
for the same crimes, because the Articles of War authorized courts-martial
only for the offenses they enumerated, and those were mostly breaches of
discipline.9" As Carol Chomsky explains, "In essence, these military com-
missions [utilized also by General Zachary Taylor] replaced the civilian
criminal courts in occupied, hostile territory after the declaration of martial
law."93 Scott employed another type of tribunal to punish violations of the
"laws of war" (i.e. the emerging customary standards concerning the proper
conduct of warfare). It is these court-martial-like bodies, then called "coun-
cils of war," that provided the real models for subsequent military commis-
sions.94
During the Civil War, the Union Army made extensive use of that type
of tribunal to punish war crimes." It was less than clear whether these mili-
tary commissions were legal, as statutory authority for them remained mea-
ger.96 Even at high levels within the War Department there was disagreement
about whether they could properly be employed to try civilians accused of
violating the laws of war.' Such tribunals were extensively used for that
purpose, however, especially in hotly contested border states, such as Mis-
tary commission. What George Washington utilized in his case was a Court of Inquiry, which
he charged with studying the incident to determine whether Andr6 was a spy. WILLIAM
WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 518 (1920, reprinted 1979).
92. Carol Chomsky, The United States-Dakota War Trials: A Study in Military Justice,
43 STAN. L. REV. 13, 63 (1990).
93. Id. at 64.
94. Id. at 65.
95. Id. at 66. Military commissions were also used as part of military government in oc-
cupied rebel territory. Id. Confederate territory occupied by Union forces accounted for 31.9
percent of trials by military commission. MARK E. NEELY, JR., Tim FATE OF LIBERTY:
ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 169 (1991). Over half of these were in Tennessee.
Id.
96. Chomsky, supra note 92, at 66.
97. In 1864, a commission, headed by General John A. Dix, commander of the Depart-
ment of the East, concluded
that no persons except such as are in the military or naval service of the United
States are subject to trial by military courts, spies only excepted, and that except in
districts under martial law, a military commission cannot try any person whatso-
ever not in the U.S. military or naval service for any offense whatever.
NEELY, supra note 95, at 144. On the other hand, Francis Lieber, the pioneering political sci-
entist who drafted the War Department's General Order 100, "Instructions for the Govern-
ment of the Armies of the United States in the Field," id. at 153, took the position that "un-
doubtedly a citizen under these conditions can, or rather must, be tried by military courts,
because there is no other way to try him and repress the crime which may endanger the whole
country . I.." d. at 160.
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souri. Most of those tried by military commission in these areas were ac-
cused of guerrilla activities, horse stealing, and bridge burning." After the
fighting ended, Captain Henry Wirz, the commandant of the infamous Con-
federate prison camp at Andersonville, Georgia, was also tried by a military
commission on charges of violating "the laws and customs of war."'"
After World War II, the United States government again made extensive
use of military commissions and specially constituted military tribunals
staffed by civilian lawyers and judges to try enemy soldiers, sailors, and ci-
vilians for war crimes."1 Some of these tribunals, such as those that tried the
leading German war criminals at Nuremberg'" and top leaders of Imperial
Japan in Tokyo, 3 were international bodies, in which the defendants were
prosecuted and judged by representatives of a number of Allied nations.
Other tribunals were purely American operations.'" For example, the United
States alone tried thirteen senior German generals and admirals at Nurem-
berg for war crimes, as well as for initiating wars of aggression and inva-
sions of other countries,'15 and also prosecuted a bevy of bureaucrats from
98. See id at 168-69. There were 1,940 military commission trials in Missouri. and only
1,339 in all eleven Confederate States combined. Id. at 168. The border states of Kentucky
and Maryland had 200 and 193 military commission trials, respectively. Id. at 168-69.
99. Id at 169. It is because there was no guerrilla warfare there, and because it was never
subjected to military invasion, that Delaware, although a border state, produced no military
commission trials at all. Id
100. See Lewis L. Laska & James M. Smith, Hell and the Devil: Andersonville and the
Trial of Captain Henry Wirz, C.S.A., 1865, 68 Mil. L. Rev. 77, 95-98 (1975). The prosecution
alleged that Wirz had violated the laws and customs of war by conspiring with others to injure
the health and destroy the lives of prisoners at Andersonville and by himself murdering thir-
teen of these prisoners. Id. at 97-98.
101. See generally LEON FRIEDMAN, THE LAw OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY -
VoL 2 (1972); PETER MAGUIRE, LAw AND WAR: AN AMERICAN STORY 101-201 (2000).
102. See BRADLEY F. SMITH, REACHING JUDGMENT AT NUREMBERG (1979); ROBERT F.
CONOT, JUSTICE AT NUREMBERG (1983); WERNER MASER, NUREMBERG: A NATION ON TRIAL
(1979); ANN TUSA & JOHN TUSA, THE NUREMBERG TRIAL (1984); TELFORD TAYLOR, THE
ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALs: A PERSONAL MEMOIR (1992) (written by one of the
top American prosecutors).
103. See RiCHARD H. MINEAR, VICTOR'S JUSTICE: THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIALS
(1977). The Supreme Court ruled that the body which tried these defendants was "not a tribu-
nal of the United States" and consequently that the courts of the United States had no power
or authority to review, affirm, set aside, or annul the judgments and sentences imposed upon
them. Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 198 (1948).
104. American lawyers and judges tried 185 Germans in twelve cases at Nuremberg be-
tween 1947 and 1949. MAGUIRE, supra note 101, at 14. The U.S. Army tried 1,672 at the
Dachau concentration camp. Id at 134. In the Pacific theater, American military courts tried
215 Japanese in Manila, 966 at Yokohama, and 116 at Kwajalein Atoll and Guam. Id.
105. FRIEDMAN, supra note 101, at 1421-70. Of these all-American Nuremberg trials,
Peter Maguire writes that, like the international one, they were intended
to create an irrefutable record of Hitler's Third Reich. Defendants were not simply
charged with violations of the customary rules of war, they were subject to the
same unprecedented standards of international conduct as the defendants at the [In-
ternational Military Tribunal]. Military leaders, politicians, lawyers, doctors, busi-
nessmen, and bankers faced charges of aggression, conspiracy, and crimes against
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the Economic and Administrative Main Office (WVHA) for war crimes and
crimes against humanity."° In the Far East, it tried officers of the Japanese
Imperial Navy for killing unarmed American prisoners of war in the Mar-
shall Islands" 7 and an army general for outrages perpetrated by his soldiers
in the Philippines between December 12, 1941 and August 5, 1942.101 The
most famous of these purely American post-World War II trials was that of
General Tomoyuki Yamashita. A military commission sentenced Yamashita
to death for atrocities committed by his troops, which included exterminat-
ing Filipino civilians and cruelly and inhumanely mistreating both civilian
detainees and prisoners of war."°
Thus, the use of military commissions to try enemies of the United
States for war crimes and related violations of international law, such as
crimes against humanity, committed abroad (or in the case of the Civil War,
in a theater of operations that, while theoretically within the United States,
was in reality not under the control of the U.S. government) has a long his-
tory. It is also legal under international law, because all nations have juris-
diction to punish war criminals, and the Geneva Convention requires each
signatory to search them out and bring them to justice in its own courts."'
The United States shares with other countries jurisdiction over war crimi-
nals,"' and in theory it could exercise that jurisdiction through civilian fed-
eral district courts. Congress, however, has authorized these courts to try war
crimes only when either the perpetrator or the victim is a U.S. national."'
While an International Criminal Court recently was established, it does not
have the authority to prosecute acts committed in Afghanistan prior to July
1, 2002."' For some cases, military forums are the only workable option, and
humanity.
MAGUIRE, supra note 101, at 14.
106. FRIEDMAN, supra note 101, at 1254-80. The defendants in this case were accused of
murder, plundering public property, torture, illegal imprisonment and enslavement, and de-
portation to slave labor of, and brutalities, atrocities, and other inhumane and criminal acts
against, prisoners of war and the civilian populations of occupied countries. Id. at 1256-57.
107. Id. at 1471-81.
108. See Homma v. Patterson, 327 U.S. 759 (1946).
109. FRIEDMAN, supra note 101, at 1596-98. In approving the findings and sentence of
the commission, General Douglas MacArthur said he considered it appropriate to punish
General Yamashita for crimes actually committed by his subordinates because four days after
the landing of American forces in Leyte, it had been publicly proclaimed that he would "hold
the Japanese military authorities in the Philippines immediately liable for any harm which
may result from the failure to accord to prisoners of war, civilian internees or civilian non-
combatants the proper treatment and protection to which they of right are entitled." Id. at
1599.
110. Newton, supra note 89, at 47-48.
111. See id. at 48.
112. See 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2001).
113. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc.
AICONF.183/9 (1998). More than the required sixty nations ratified this agreement on April
11, 2002, establishing the International Criminal Court, and the agreement enters into force on
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at least within the context of an international armed conflict, deployed com-
manders have the authority to convene them."' As of April 2002, the Bush
Administration was making plans to employ a military commission to try
Abu Zubaydah, al Qaeda's chief of operations, who had been apprehended in
Pakistan.'
5
Even when employed against members of the enemy's armed forces ac-
cused of war crimes committed in a theater of operations abroad, military
commissions can make American justice look bad. Frank Reel, who as a
U.S. Army lawyer defended General Yamashita,"' echoes those who insisted
that in the Yamashita case the United States missed a great opportunity.
Rather than using it to demonstrate why this country had fought a war
against totalitarianism, "[w]e adopted their judicial techniques.""' Justice
Frank Murphy found that "[tihe failure of the military commission to obey
the dictates of the due process requirements of the Fifth Amendment...
[was] apparent in this case,""' 8 and his colleague, Wiley Rutledge, could not
"believe in the face of this record that the petitioner has had the fair trial our
Constitution and laws command."'1 9 Rutledge had no sympathy for anyone
who would commit the atrocities of which Yamashita was accused, but he
believed there was more at stake in this case than the fate of a Japanese gen-
eral. "[T]here can and should be justice administered according to law,"' "
Rutledge insisted. He was concerned that this country was forsaking "the ba-
sic standards of trial which, among other guarantees, the nation fought to
July 1, 2002. Nations Approve First Permanent World War Crimes Tribunal, CNN.com Law
Center, at http:llwww.cnn.comV2002/LAW0411ITintemational.courapindex.html.
114. Newton, supra note 89, at 78.
115. According to the New York Times:
A senior administration official said that although there had been no final decision.
it seemed certain that Mr. Zubaydah would be tried before one of the military tri-
bunals established under rules approved by the Pentagon last month. The official.
who spoke on condition of anonymity, said his capture could end a debate simmer-
ing within the administration over whether any of the prisoners now in custody in
Guantnnamo would be suitable candidates for a tribunal.
Philip Shenon & Neil A. Lewis, U.S. Says a Key Detainee Had Planned More Attacks, N.Y.
TIMEs, Apr. 3, 2002, at A10.
Jordan Paust would clearly consider the trial of Zubaydah before an American military
commission sitting at Guantnamo Bay unlawful. According to him, "lO]utside of... occu-
pied territory, it is apparent that military commissions can only be constituted in an actual war
zone ... " Paust, supra note 16, at 9.
116. See A. FRANKREEL, TIM CASE OFGEiERAL YAMASHrrA 8-9 (1949).
117. l at 241. General Yamashita was convicted by a commission consisting of five
generals appointed by his victorious opponent, General Douglas MacArthur, none of whom
was a lawyer. MAGURE, supra note 101, at 135. This military commission did not follow the
technical rules of evidence, and indeed accepted as evidence of Yamashita's guilt a "pseudo-
documentary movie" depicting a Japanese order for the destruction of Manila that apparently
never existed. See id at 135-36.
118. Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 27 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 42 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
120. ld
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keep.... .' 2  The result of doing that, Reel believed, was that "[d]amage was
done-affirmative damage, to ourselves and to the faith of men the world
over in the honesty and objectiveness of our legal structure.' 2 2
III. DOMESTIC MILITARY COMMISSION TRIALS
Potentially damaging to American interests even when employed to try
foreign enemies for war crimes committed overseas, military commissions
are far more menacing when employed at home. Abuses and injustice pock-
mark the domestic record of these tribunals.
A. The Dakota War Trials
During the Civil War, the Union used military commissions not only to
prosecute pro-Confederate guerrillas, but also to condemn over 300 Dakota
Sioux to death. The defendants in those trials had participated in an 1862 up-
rising against whites in the State of Minnesota, which began after the Dakota
refused to hand over four of their young men who had murdered five Ameri-
can settlers."2 3 During the course of this war, the Native Americans engaged
in several battles with United States volunteer troops, twice attacked a town
in which citizen-soldiers fought to defend more than a thousand weaponless
men, women, and children, and took by surprise a number of isolated settle-
ments where they killed unarmed men and carried off women and children
as prisoners." ' During thirty-seven days of fighting, the Dakota killed sev-
enty-seven American soldiers, twenty-nine citizen-soldiers, and approxi-
mately 358 settlers, while losing an estimated twenty-nine of their own war-
riors.125 When they surrendered, Brigadier General Henry H. Sibley,
commander of the volunteer forces that fought against them, assured their
leaders that he would punish only those Indians who had committed "murder
and outrages upon the white settlers." ' 6
Many of the 392 Dakota tried between September 28 and November 3
by the six-member military commission that Sibley appointed, however,
were accused of nothing more than participation in the fighting.'27 The
121. Id.
122. REEL, supra note 116, at 241. In a critique of President Bush's Military Order, Jor-
dan Paust makes a similar point:
[T]he United States has told the world that it is fighting terrorism for democratic
values and freedom. Certain forms of military commissions would appear to be
most inappropriate in view of what the United States stands for and what it has told
the world it is fighting for and against.
Paust, supra note 16, at 10.
123. See Chomsky, supra note 92, at 17-18.
124. Id. at 19-20.
125. Id. at 21-22.
126. Id. at 22.
127. See id. at 23-27. Most of the defendants were charged with murder, but a few were
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Commission nevertheless convicted all but sixty-nine of them, and sentenced
303 to death."2 8 As Chomsky reports, "All defendants found to have partici-
pated in any fighting, whether against soldiers or against settlers, whether in
a pitched battle or in a raid, were convicted and sentenced to be hanged."'' 2
That is perhaps not surprising, for all of the officers who sat on the commis-
sion were local residents who had themselves taken part in the fighting
against the Dakota."3 They carried out their bloody work with incredible ra-
pidity, trying as many as forty-two Native Americans in a single day."' Most
of the accused did not have counsel,' and most of the testimony on the basis
of which they were convicted and condemned came from individuals who
were themselves on trial for their lives."' Local ministers and officials who
reviewed transcripts of the proceedings for President Lincoln criticized what
they found there,"M and even General Sibley, while seeking to defend these
military commission trials, acknowledged obvious unfairness in the way
they were conducted.' Lincoln was concerned enough about potential in-
justice to the accused that he commuted the death sentences of all but thirty-
nine of the convicted men. 36 As Chomsky points out, "It has become a
also charged with robbery or rape. Id at 27.
128. Id. at 28. Those the commission found to have engaged only in plundering, rather
than fighting against whites, it sentenced to imprisonment for terms ranging from one to ten
years. I&
129. Id
130. 1I at 55.
131. Id. at 46-47. "The Commission conducted the trials very rapidly, with as many as
thirty or forty trials in a single day. After hearing the evidence, the Commission would clear
the room, deliberate for a few minutes, and announce the verdict." Id.
132. See id at 53. "In the absence of counsel, the Judge Advocate was responsible both
for prosecuting the case and assisting the accused in preparing his case. Even in a normal
court-martial, this assistance was recognized as inadequate." Id.
133. Id. at 50. Most of these self-interested witnesses were half-bloods and Indians who
had adopted American ways. Id
134. See id at 53.
135. See id at 54. In a letter to Assistant Secretary of the Interior John Usher, which he
wrote on December 19, 1862, Sibley stated:
The degree of guilt [of the defendants] was not one of the objects to be attained [by
the commission], and indeed it would have been impossible to devote as much
time in eliciting the details in each of so many hundred cases, as would have been
required while the [American military] expedition was in the field. Every man who
was condemned was sufficiently proven to be a voluntary participant, and no doubt
exists in my mind that a least seven-eighths of those sentenced to be hung have
been guilty of the most flagrant outrages....
Id
136. See id at 30, 32-33. In determining which prisoners he would grant clemency and
which he would allow to be hung, Lincoln drew a distinction between those who had partici-
pated in "battles" and those who had participated in "massacres." Only the latter were exe-
cuted. Id.
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commonplace observation that the United States-Dakota war trials were
unfair."'37
B. The Vallandigham Case
The cases tried before many other Civil War military commissions were
also unfair, for "the proceedings were marred by irregularities in trial proce-
dure and overzealousness in prosecuting and sentencing.""' 8 Some of these
trials, unlike the Dakota ones (which at least involved defendants who had
actually borne arms against American soldiers and civilians) were blatantly
political prosecutions that targeted men whose principal offense was opposi-
tion to the policies of those in power. A particularly gross example of this
was the 1863 case of Clement L. Vallandigham.'39
Vallandigham, a pro-Southern "Copperhead"'" Democrat, called openly
for an end to the Civil War. 4' In addition to opposing Lincoln's efforts to
preserve the Union by force, he condemned the military draft and the aboli-
tion of slavery and criticized the Administration for suspending the writ of
habeas corpus and subjecting civilians to arbitrary military arrest.' 2 After
losing his Ohio congressional seat in 1862, because the state legislature had
redrawn the boundaries of his district, and the Republicans had targeted him
for defeat,' 3 Vallandigham decided to run for governor.'" Apparently believ-
ing that martyrdom would endear him to his fellow Democrats, and thus help
him secure his party's nomination, he blatantly defied the Lincoln admini-
stration's policy of curtailing political speech critical of its programs.t ' As
part of that policy, the commanding general of the Department of the Ohio,
137. Id. at 46.
138. Id. at 59.
139. See generally FRANK L. KLEMENT, THE LIMITS OF DISSENT: CLEMENT L.
VALLANDIGHAM & THE CIviL WAR (1970) [hereinafter KLEMENT, LIMITS]; WILLIAM H.
REHNQUIST, ALL THE LIBERTIES BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 59-74 (1998).
140. The epithet "Copperhead" was used to describe Northerners who were sympathetic
to the South and who allegedly manifested overt disloyalty to the Union. See REHNQUIST, Su-
pra note 139, at 102. Not all Democrats were Copperheads. So-called "War Democrats," al-
though opposing the Republican Lincoln Administration on other issues, supported its effort
to preserve the Union by force of arms. See JOEL H. SILBEY, A RESPECTABLE MINORITY: THE
DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA, 1860-1868, at 56-59 (1977).
141. Michael Kent Curtis, Lincoln, Vallandigham, and Anti-War Speech in the Civil
War, 7 WM. & MARY BIL OF RTS. J. 105, 113 (1998). The opposition of such men to the war
was often extreme. "The Dayton Daily Empire, a newspaper Vallandigham influenced heav-
ily, described Ohio governor Denison's efforts to raise Union troops after Fort Sumter as a
scheme to 'butcher men, women and children' of the South." Id. at 114.
142. See id. at 112-14. On the Lincoln Administration's suppression of civil liberties
through the arbitrary military arrest of civilians, see generally id. at 115-17, and NEELY, supra
note 95. Like many of his contemporaries, especially in the Democratic Party, "Vallandigham
was a racist." Curtis, supra note 141, at 113.
143. Curtis, supra note 141, at 113.
144. Id.
145. KLEMENT, LIMITS, supra note 139, at 154.
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Ambrose Burnside, had issued General Orders No. 38, which proclaimed:
"The habit of declaring sympathies for the enemy will not be allowed in this
Department. Persons committing such offenses will be at once arrested.""
On May 1, 1863, Vallandigham delivered a speech to a Knox County De-
mocratic political rally at Mount Vernon, in which he branded the war a
wicked, cruel and unnecessary struggle, being fought to crush out liberty,
and to erect a despotism that would mean freedom for blacks but enslave-
ment for whites. He also excoriated General Orders No. 38, which he charac-
terized as "a base usurpation of arbitrary authority," and called upon his lis-
teners to resist Burnside's directive."7
Military agents in civilian clothes had monitored Vallandigham's
speech," and in the early morning hours of May 5, soldiers arrested him."'
His trial before a military commission, comprised of seven officers, began
the next day. 5 Vallandigham immediately denied that such a body had any
jurisdiction over him; refusing to plead, he forced the Judge Advocate to en-
ter a not-guilty plea for him.' The commission adjourned briefly to enable
Vallandigham to procure counsel, but the three lawyers he retained chose to
remain in an adjacent room throughout his brief trial, while the defendant
146. Curtis, supra note 141, at 119. Although it is tempting to credit General Order 38 to
the stupidity of General Burnside, whose most notable achievement up to the time when he
issued it was losing the Battle of Fredricksburg, that order was clearly in line with and served
to implement the policies of President Lincoln. On September 24, 1862, Lincoln issued a
proclamation providing that "all persons discouraging volunteer enlistments, resisting militia
drafts, or guilty of any disloyal practice" were to be "subject to martial law and liable to trial
and punishment by Courts-Martial or Military Commission." Id. at 117.
147. I. at 121-22. The specification to the charge against him, filed by the army. al-
leged:
Clement L. Vallandigham, a citizen of the State of Ohio, on or about the first day
of May, 1863, at Mount Vernon, Knox County, Ohio, did publicly address a large
meeting of citizens, and did utter sentiments in words, or in effect, as follows, de-
claring the present war "a wicked, cruel and unnecessary war," "a war not being
waged for the preservation of the Union;" "a war for the purpose of crushing out
liberty and erecting a despotism;" "a war for the freedom of the blacks and the en-
slavement of the whites;" stating "that if the Administration had so wished, the war
could have been honorably terminated months ago;" that "peace might have been
honorably obtained by listening to the proposed intermediation of France:"...
charging "that the Government of the United States was about to appoint military
marshals in every district, to restrain the people of their liberties, to deprive them
of their rights and privileges;" characterizing General Orders No. 38, from Head-
quarters department of the Ohio "as a base usurpation of arbitrary authority;" invit-
ing his hearers to resist the same, by saying, "the sooner the people inform the
minions of usurped power that they will not submit to such restrictions upon their
liberties, the better ..
Id. at 122-23.
148. Id at 121.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (I Wall.) 243, 245 (1863).
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conducted his own cross-examination."' The proceedings were so speedy
that Vallandigham did not even have time to subpoena one of his wit-
nesses.153 The only person to testify for the defense was Samuel S. Cox, a
Democratic congressman, who had been present during the Mt. Vernon
speech and insisted he had heard no advocacy of forcible resistance to laws
or military orders." ' The army officers who testified for the prosecution did
not disagree; one of them admitted the defendant had said he would not
counsel resistance to military or civil law.'" Nevertheless, the commission
convicted Vallandigham and sentenced him to close confinement for the du-
ration of the war.'
56
Although it took this action on May 16, the commission had finished
hearing evidence and arguments by May 7." The intervening nine days had
been consumed by a battle over whether it had jurisdiction to try Val-
landigham. At the conclusion of his brief trial, the defendant read a state-
ment in which he contended that, because he was neither in the land or naval
forces of the United States, nor a member of the militia in federal service, he
was "not triable for any cause by any such court.""' 8 Vallandigham con-
tended that he could properly be tried only upon an indictment or present-
ment of a grand jury before a "court of competent jurisdiction for the trial of
citizens," operating in accordance with the rules of the common law, where
he would have an impartial jury and enjoy the rights of confrontation, com-
pulsory process, and assistance of counsel. 59 On May 9, George Pugh, a
leading Democratic lawyer and former U.S. senator from Ohio, filed in fed-
eral court an application for habeas corpus on Vallandigham's behalf."w Rep-
resenting General Burnside, Cincinnati lawyer Benjamin F. Perry argued
that the arrest and military trial of the petitioner had been justified under the
President's war power and his authority as Commander in Chief. These ex-
isted alongside and superseded the civil law for the duration of the conflict,
Perry maintained. 6 Siding with him, Judge Humphrey H. Leavitt refused to
issue Vallandigham a writ of habeas corpus. 62 After Burnside confirmed his
conviction and sentence, Vallandigham challenged the jurisdiction of the
152. Id. Since Vallandigham was an experienced trial lawyer, he was perfectly compe-
tent to represent himself. Curtis, supra note 141, at 121.
153. KLEMENT, LIMITS, supra note 139, at 166.
154. See Vallandigham, 68 U.S. at 245-46; Curtis, supra note 141, at 124. The Judge
Advocate stipulated that if the other three persons whom Vallandigham had summoned as
witnesses had appeared, they would have given evidence substantially the same as that pre-
sented by Congressman Cox. 68 U.S. at 246.
155. Curtis, supra note 141, at 123-24.
156. Id. at 131.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 124.
159. 68 U.S. at 246.
160. Curtis, supra note 141, at 125
161. See id. at 128-29.
162. Id. at 130.
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military commission in the Supreme Court. The Court refused to grant his
petition for a writ of certiorari, holding that it lacked the authority under ap-
plicable jurisdictional statutes and the Constitution "to review or pronounce
any opinion upon the proceedings of a military commission."'"
Although surviving legal challenge, the Vallandigham prosecution ex-
cited massive protest by Democrats and even evoked criticism from many
Republicans." Forced to defend his policy of military arrests of civilians,
Lincoln wrote a letter to Erastus Coming and other New York Democrats, in
which he conceded it would have been wrong to arrest the former congress-
man merely for giving a speech that damaged the political prospects of the
Administration, but insisted Vallandigham had been hurting the army by en-
couraging desertion and discouraging enlistments." The whole affair was
sufficiently embarrassing to the Administration that Lincoln changed the
Ohio Copperhead's punishment from imprisonment to banishment, ordering
that he be "put beyond our military lines.""'
C. Ex Parte Milligan
Unlike Vallandigham's case, the 1864 trial of Lamdin P. Milligan gen-
erated not only public protest but also a judicial decision limiting the juris-
diction of military commissions. An Indiana Democrat, Milligan espoused
views similar to those of Vallandigham."3 Although one of his Copperhead
allies, Harrison Horton Dodd, probably committed treason when he accepted
money from Confederate agents to subsidize a revolt by an organization he
had created, called the "Sons of Liberty,"" Milligan had no involvement in
Dodd's treasonous activities. Dodd had appointed him a major general in the
military branch of the Sons of Liberty, but he apparently never bothered to
tell his appointee about his supposed position in what remained largely a pa-
163. 68 U.S. at 251-52.
164. See Curtis, supra note 141, at 131.
165. NEELY, supra note 95, at 66-67. To his credit, Lincoln failed to sign a military or-
der, drafted by Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, that would have suspended the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus solely in Vallandigham's case, as a way of preventing a civilian
court from ruling on whether the military commission had jurisdiction to try him. Id. at 66.
166. Curtis, supra note 141, at 131.
167. See Frank L. Klement, The Indianapolis Treason Trials and Ex Pare Milligan, in
BELKNAP, AMERICAN POLITICAL TRIALS, supra note 12, at 97. 100 [hereinafter Klement.
Treason Trials]. According to Klement, Milligan "hated New England and the 'isms'-
protectionism, abolitionism, and Puritanism...." In addition, he believed Lincoln had vio-
lated the Constitution by transforming the Union into a centralized government and feared
civil liberties were in danger. Id. at 100.
168. See id. at 101-02. The Constitution defines treason as "levying War against (the
United States], or... adhering to their Enemies, giving them aid and Comfort." U.S. CoNsr.,
art. III, § 3. Interestingly, Dodd and an ally, Dr. Thomas C. Massey of Ohio, managed to per-
suade Vallandigham, then living in exile in Windsor, Canada West, to accept nominal leader-
ship of the Sons of Liberty, as a way of recruiting his defenders and followers into the organi-
zation. Klement, Treason Trials, supra note 167, at 101.
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per organization, which most Democrats shunned after an Indianapolis Daily
Journal expos6 of its subversive character."
Milligan found himself on trial for treason before a military commission
not because he had committed that crime, but because the Republican gover-
nor of Indiana, Oliver P. Morton, hoped to discredit the Democratic opposi-
tion on the eve of the 1864 elections. Morton asked one of his aides, Briga-
dier General Henry B. Carrington, and the commanding general of the
Northern Department to dig up evidence against top Democrats and make
arrests. Utilizing a half-dozen detectives, Carrington put Dodd, Milligan, and
several others allegedly associated with the Sons of Liberty under surveil-
lance, raided Dodd's office, and passed everything incriminating that he
found along to the editor of the Republican-oriented Daily Journal for publi-
cation.'70 When his star detective, Felix Stidger, learned that Dodd was ex-
pecting a shipment of revolvers, intended for use in a "rebellion" for which
he was trying without much success to enlist support, Carrington pounced. A
military posse arrested Dodd and several acquaintances, including
Milligan.' According to historian Frank Klement, "Morton was most anx-
ious that [the] trial before a military commission begin in September, in time
to grind grist for the October state elections.""' Major Henry L. Burnett, the
Judge Advocate of the Northern Department, who came over from Ohio "to
draft the charges and specifications and direct Morton's show ... selected
seven army officers, several of whom were personal friends of the governor
and strong partisans, to comprise the military commission."'' 3
The commission started with Dodd, but in the middle of his trial, the
only real traitor among the defendants escaped from the second floor of the
Indianapolis post office, where he was being confined, and fled to Canada.
His flight was a political bonanza for the Republicans, who exploited it ef-
fectively to substantiate charges of a Democratic conspiracy.'74 On October
11, one day after the military commission met briefly to convict Dodd in ab-
sentia and sentence him to death, Governor Morton won re-election.'"
169. Klement, Treason Trials, supra note 167, at 101-02. Of the defendants in this case
other than Dodd, Chief Justice William Rehnquist writes that they "had engaged in little more
than talk." REHNQUIST, supra note 139, at 100-01.
170. See Klement, Treason Trials, supra note 167, at 102.
171. See id. at 102-03. Several Democratic leaders, including Joseph Bingham (the
chairman of the Democratic State Central Committee) and Joseph McDonald, knew about
Dodd's "proposal" to stage a rebellion on August 16, during a scheduled Democratic mass
meeting in Indianapolis. Rather than report it, however, they took steps to quash his plan and
cover it up, because they realized that if Governor Morton heard of it, "he would make politi-
cal hay." Id. This probably made them guilty of misprision of treason. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 4
(2002).
172. Klement, Treason Trials, supra note 167, at 103.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 104.
175. See id.
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Judge Advocate Burnett then added five more Indiana officers to the
commission (some of whose original members had spent the recess in the
Dodd proceeding giving political speeches) and brought the remaining pris-
oners, including Milligan, to trial.76 As was customary in a military commis-
sion proceeding, the defendants had been arraigned on a series of general
charges ("Conspiracy Against the Government of the United States," "Af-
fording Aid and Comfort to Rebels Against the Authority of the United
States," and "Inciting Insurrection"), each of which was followed by more
particularized specifications of the conduct that allegedly made them guilty
of that offense. Neither the charges against Milligan and his co-defendants
nor the specifications enumerated under them made reference to any federal
statute criminalizing their alleged misconduct." As Chief Justice William
Rehnquist has pointed out, because "a military commission could simply de-
cide for itself what acts were criminal, and what sentence was appropriate
upon conviction, a defendant before such a commission suffered [a] serious
deprivation, compared with his counterpart in a civil court.""' Also handi-
capping Milligan and his co-defendants was the fact that, in a military com-
mission trial, the Judge Advocate (in this case the highly partisan Major Bur-
nett) functioned in effect as both judge and prosecutor.'"
In his role as prosecutor, Burnett presented as his star witness Detective
Stidger. According to Klement, some of Stidger's testimony against Milligan
was based on rumor, rather than fact; in addition, the detective cribbed in-
formation from published reports and made a number of allegations that
were "outright falsehoods."'' " Nevertheless, the far from impartial military
commission convicted all of the accused and sentenced all but one of them
to be executed.' Although Governor Morton had publicly pronounced
Milligan and the others guilty even before the trial began," once the defen-
dants were condemned to death, he began seeking clemency for them. '" The
reason was simple. "He had used the arrests and trials as a stratagem to in-
sure his own and Lincoln's reelection, but now he did not want the blood of
176. Id. at 104-05.
177. REHNQUIST, supra note 139, at 84-85. The specifications to the Conspiracy Against
the Government charge recited various hostile activities of the defendants, while the Inciting
Insurrection one had two specifications dealing with efforts to induce persons to revolt against
the authority of the United States and to cooperate with an armed enemy of the United States.
Id.
178. Id. at 86.
179. See Klement, Treason Trials, supra note 167, at 107.
180. 1& at 106.
181. Id. at 107. Those convicted along with Milligan were Andrew Humphrey, Stephen
Horsey, and Dr. Samuel Bowles. See id at 107-08. The only one not to receive the death pen-
alty was Humphrey, against whom "the evidence ... was especially flimsy." Id. at 108.
The prosecutor released several others from among the group of Democrats who were
originally arrested, including Bingham, in order to obtain their testimony as witnesses. See id.
at 105.
182 Id. at 107.
183. Id. at 108.
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the convicted men upon his hands. Political expediency called for clem-
ency."'' 4 Andrew Johnson, who became President when Lincoln was assassi-
nated, commuted the sentence of one of the three condemned men, but ini-
tially refused to spare Milligan, forcing him to seek deliverance in the civil
courts."5
Milligan filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. Circuit
Court for Indiana, contending that the military commission that had sen-
tenced him to death had been without jurisdiction to try him.8' One of the
judges who heard the case was Justice David Davis of the Supreme Court.
Davis had become increasingly concerned about the propriety of trying civil-
ians before military commissions. 7 So had both houses of Congress, which
had passed a resolution in March 1865 condemning the practice.'88 Davis and
U.S. District Judge Thomas Drummond formally disagreed on the issue
Milligan had raised, thus certifying it to the Supreme Court.'89 In 1866, with
Davis writing the opinion, the Court handed down a landmark ruling limiting
the jurisdiction of military commissions. In Ex parte Milligan, '" it rejected
as unsound the proposition that, in time of war, the commander of an armed
force, when convinced that the exigencies of the country demanded such ac-
tion, might suspend all civil rights and their remedies and subject citizens as
well as soldiers to his will, limited only by such restraints as a superior offi-
cer or the President might impose."' Except for members of the military, all
"citizens of states where the courts are open, if charged with a crime, are
guaranteed the inestimable privilege of trial by jury," the Court declared."
Martial rule might be employed when, due to foreign invasion or civil war,
the courts were closed, and it was "impossible to administer criminal justice
according to law."'93 But only in a "theater of active military operations,
where war really prevails," was it necessary to furnish a substitute for civil
184. Id. An advisor wrote to Morton: "From a political point of view, it can do our party
no good to shed more blood; but on the contrary, if we are merciful, the child is not yet born
who will see the defeat of the Republican party." Id.
185. Id. at 108-09. Two days before his scheduled execution (and after the May 10, 1865
filing of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus) Johnson finally commuted the sentences of
Milligan and his co-defendant, Samuel Bowles, to life imprisonment. See id. at 109; Ex parte
Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
186. See 71 U.S. at 185-86.
187. Klement, Treason Trials, supra note 167, at 109. Justice Davis took the unusual
step of writing a confidential letter to President Andrew Johnson, urging him to postpone
Milligan's execution. In this letter he asserted that Milligan had been sentenced by "a new
tribunal unknown to the common law." JONATHAN LURIE, MILITARY JUSTICE IN AMERICA 24
(2001).
188. Klement, Treason Trials, supra note 167, at 109, 117 n.83.
189. Id. at 109-10; REHNQUIST, supra note 139, at 117.
190. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
191. Id. at 124.
192. See id.
193. Id. at 127.
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authority.94 "Martial rule" was impermissible where "the courts are open,
and in the proper and unobstructed exercise of their jurisdiction."'" Klement
lauds the Court for proclaiming "in sweeping terms and living prose that the
constitutional rights of citizens would be protected by the federal courts, in
times of war as well as in peace.""t So does Chief Justice Rehnquist, who
writes, "The Milligan decision is justly celebrated for its rejection of the
government's position that the Bill of Rights has no application in war-
time."' In his magisterial history of the Supreme Court, Charles Warren
celebrated Milligan as "one of the bulwarks of American liberty."''
Pulitzer Prize-winning historian Mark Neely points out, however, that
despite the Milligan decision, "[T]rials by military commission contin-
ued."'" There were 1,435 of them between the end of April 1865 and Janu-
ary 1, 1869, "and still more in 1869 and 1870." Some, such as a series of
trials in Louisville, Kentucky, were prosecutions for guerrilla activity during
the war."' Others involved civilians accused of illegally selling liquor to sol-
diers and of defrauding the government.' Military commissions were used
in the occupied South, as they had been earlier in conquered Mexican terri-
tory, to restrain undisciplined soldiers."' After President Johnson proclaimed
the war officially over on April 2, 1866, the army announced that such tribu-
nals would no longer be used "where justice can be attained through the me-
dium of civil authority," and the number declined to about three per month
between June 1866 and April 1867.' Congressional passage of the Military
Reconstruction Act of March 2, 1867 revitalized military commissions. Sec-
tion 3 of that law authorized the commanders placed in charge of the South-
ern states to employ such tribunals when they considered them necessary to
suppress insurrection, disorder, and violence, or to punish criminals and
194. ld.
195. 1& Accord In re Egan, 8 F. Cas. 367 (C.C.N.D.Y. 1866). In ordering the release of a
civilian from South Carolina, who had been convicted of murder and sentenced to a life term
at the federal penitentiary in Albany, New York by a military commission, Supreme Court
Justice Samuel Nelson took the position that the party seeking to exercise military jurisdiction
over someone who was not a member of the armed forces had the burden of affirmatively
proving the "necessity ... to exercise this extraordinary and irregular power over the life, lib-
erty and property of the citizen .. L." Id  at 368. Egan was decided June 22, 1866. Justice Nel-
son thus made his ruling between the announcement of the decision in Milligan, which came
in April 1866, and the publication of the opinion in that case, which did not occur until De-
cember. See NEELY, supra note 95, at 178.
196. Klement, Treason Trials, supra note 167, at 112.
197. REHNQUIST, supra note 139, at 137.
198. 3 CHARLEs WARREN, THE SUPREmE COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 149 (1926).
199. NEELY, supra note 95, at 176.
200. Id. at 176-77.
201. ld at 177.
202. See id
203. See id at 177-78.
204. Id at 178.
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breachers of the public peace. 5 The number convened in May 1867 ex-
ceeded the total for the previous eleven months combined."° Then on June
12, Attorney General Henry Stanberry issued an opinion, which proclaimed
that, because hostilities had ceased, any act conferring military authority
over civilians must be strictly construed, and consequently that commanders
might properly supersede civil jurisdiction by the institution of military tri-
bunals only in extreme emergencies. 2' The number of military commission
trials decreased, and they ended entirely when all of the Southern states were
readmitted to the Union.2 8 Thus, while the Milligan decision did not put an
end to military commission trials, by 1877, they were a thing of the past.
D. The Lincoln Conspiracy Case
By then, the nation had witnessed two more trials that have helped give
military commissions a bad name. One (clearly unconstitutional had
Milligan been decided a year earlier) was the 1865 trial of eight civilians ac-
cused of conspiring with John Wilkes Booth to assassinate President Lincoln
on April 14, 1865. Twelve days after the assassination, Booth was killed by
Union soldiers at the Garrett farm near Port Royal, Virginia,"° but by then an
investigation, personally directed by Secretary of War Edwin Stanton and
Judge Advocate General Joseph Holt, had resulted in the arrest of several in-
dividuals who had allegedly assisted him. All of them were charged with
conspiring to kill Lincoln, Vice President Andrew Johnson, Secretary of
State William Seward, and Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant." ' Their
roles in the plot differed greatly. Lewis Powell and David Harold had at-
tempted to murder Seward."' George Atzerodt agreed to kill Johnson, and
205. 14 Stat. 428, 428 (1867).
206. NEELY, supra note 95, at 178.
207. WINTHROP, supra note 91, at 849-50. Stanberry was an opponent of the Military
Reconstruction Acts, who attempted to hamstring their operation and refused to appear to de-
fend them in the famous case of Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869). See
HAROLD M. HYMAN, A MORE PERFECT UNION: THE IMPACT OF THE CIVIL WAR AND
RECONSTRUCTION ON THE CONSTITUTION 502, 504 (1975).
208. NEELY, supra note 95, at 179.
209. See EDWARD STEERS, JR., BLOOD ON THE MOON: THE ASSASSINATION OF ABRAHAM
LINCOLN 202-04 (2001). The man who killed Booth was Sergeant Boston Corbett, who felled
him with a single shot from a Colt revolver. Id.
210. REH:NQUIST, supra note 139, at 144-46. On the night of April 14, defendant Lewis
Thornton Powell seriously injured Seward in an attack on him at his house, but failed to kill
the Secretary of State. See STEERS, supra note 209, at 126. Defendant George Atzerodt was
supposed to kill Vice President Johnson in his room at the Kirkwood Hotel, but he lost his
nerve and fled from Washington without ever actually trying to do so. See id. at 112, 166-67.
General Grant, who was invited by Lincoln to accompany him to Ford's Theater, where
Booth attacked the President, did not do so because his wife wanted to leave Washington that
evening to visit their children, who were attending school in New Jersey. See id. at 96-98.
211. While Powell entered Seward's house and attacked him, Herold, who was supposed
to serve as his guide, waited outside for him. However, when he heard screams, Herold pan-
icked and fled. STEERS, supra note 209, at 112, 126, 130.
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got as close as the bar in the Vice President's hotel before losing his nerve
and running away."' Michael O'Laughlin and Samuel Arnold were partici-
pants in an earlier unsuccessful plot to kidnap Lincoln, but had apparently
returned to their homes in Baltimore by the time Booth changed the objec-
tive of the conspiracy to murder."' Edman Spangler was a stagehand at
Ford's Theater, who, at Booth's request, had briefly held his horse outside
the theater while he was inside killing Lincoln."' Dr. Samuel Mudd had set
the assassin's broken leg while he was a fugitive.2 Mary E. Surratt was the
proprietor of a Washington, D.C. boarding house, where one of the other
conspirators, Lewis Powell, had lived under an assumed name and where
Booth had met with other members of his team.1 6 She had allegedly deliv-
ered a message for the assassin on April 14,27 and her son John was deeply
involved in the conspiracy.
218
At the urging of Stanton and Holt, President Johnson determined to try
Mrs. Surratt and the other alleged conspirators before a military commis-
sionY.2 9 The reason for this decision was fear that a civilian jury, comprised
of pro-Southern residents of Washington, D.C., would not convict them.-
Secretary of the Navy Gideon Wells believed that because the civil courts
were open and functioning in the capital, they should try the accused,"' and
212. See id. at 112, 166.
213. See hi at 84-88.
214. See id. at 113-14.
215. Id at 144-45. Mudd always claimed to have been an unsuspecting doctor who inno-
cently provided medical care to an injured stranger in need of his assistance, but Steers con-
tends he was in fact part of a conspiracy to remove Lincoln as president, and had met with
Booth on several occasions prior to the one on which Mudd set his broken leg. Id.
216. See i& at 83.
217. ld. at 110. Mary delivered a package that Booth had given her to John Lloyd, a tav-
ern-keeper in Surrattsville, Maryland. In addition, according to Lloyd. she gave him a mes-
sage that he should "have those shooting irons" ready that night because someone would call
for them. JL Defenders of Mary Surratt point out that Lloyd was a drunk and contend that he
lied, but defendant George Atzerodt provided corroboration for his claim when he reported
that Booth had told him Mrs. Surratt went to Surrattsville to get the guns. Id.
.218. See iL at 81-84, 137-39. At the time of the Lincoln Conspiracy Trial, John Surratt
was a fugitive from justice. He had fled to Canada, and after being hidden there for several
weeks by a Confederate agent and a Catholic priest, journeyed to London and on to Rome.
Surratt was apprehended at the Vatican, but managed to escape and was later captured in
Egypt and returned to the United States on February 19, 1867. Id. at 210, 231-32.
219. See REHNQUIST, supra note 139, at 145.
220. See STEERs, supra note 209, at 211. Most of the pro-Union men in the District of
Columbia were in the Army, and the native civilian population held strong Southern sympa-
thies. Part of the government's case was aimed at Jefferson Davis and other members of the
Confederate government, and, "[blecause of the climate in the city, Stanton and his colleagues
feared jury nullification." Il This concern was justified, for when John Surratt was tried be-
fore a civil jury in Washington in 1867, it hung. See John W. Curran, Lincoln Conspiracy
Trial and Military Jurisdiction over Civilians, 9 NOTRE DAM. LAw. 26, 46 (1933). Steers be-
lieves that Stanton's fears of jury nullification justify his resort to a military commission. See
STEERs, supra note 209, at 211. I disagree with him about that.
221. Guy W. MOORE, THE CASE OF MRS. SuRRATT 30 (1954).
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former Attorney General Edward Bates considered a military trial unconsti-
tutional.2 Wells thought Bates's successor, James Speed, also leaned toward
a civilian proceeding, but Stanton was emphatic, and Speed eventually is-
sued an opinion affirming the legality of the kind of trial the Secretary of
War wanted.223 The Attorney General justified his endorsement of a military
commission by pointing out that Washington was a war zone, ringed by for-
tifications, that martial law existed in the District of Columbia, and that
while the civilian police and courts were functioning there, the principal po-
lice authority was the armed forces. Speed characterized the accused as "en-
emy belligerents," whose actions were designed to thwart the government's
military effort. As such, they not only could be tried by a military commis-
sion, but must be. Many offenses against the laws of war were not crimes
under the civil code, and hence a civilian trial for them was impossible. 4
Two defense attorneys, Senator Reverdy Johnson and Thomas Ewing,
argued vigorously that because the regular courts were open and functioning,
the commission that President Johnson authorized on May I had no jurisdic-
tion over their clients.2" The nine officers detailed by the War Department to
hear the case,"' met in closed session to consider the defense argument.
Then, citing Speed's opinion, they ruled in favor of their own authority to
hear the case. 27 Precisely because it had been handed down by a military
commission, the defendants could not appeal this ruling to a civil court."'
Although Edward Steers, a defender of the commission, insists that "[tihere
was little opposition-and considerable public support-for a military trial
of the accused conspirators. . the fact of the matter is that most of the
222. STEERS, supra note 209, at 212. "Bates based his opposition to a military trial on his
beliefs that the accused conspirators were civilians, not members of a military organization,
and that their alleged crime was not military in nature." Id.
223. See MOORE, supra note 221, at 30. According to Steers: "A military trial would in-
sure that the process would remain in loyal hands under government control-and more im-
portant, under Stanton's control." STEERS, supra note 209, at 212.
224. STEERS, supra note 209, at 212-13. Steers agrees with this characterization. See id.
at 213. As he notes, however: "Subsequent critics of the military commission have sided with
[former Attorney General] Bates, believing the accused were civilians with no ties-directly
or indirectly-to any clandestine or military effort by the Confederate government." Id.
225. See id. Senator Johnson, a Maryland Democrat, was counsel for Mary Surratt. Ew-
ing represented Samuel Mudd and Samuel Arnold. Id. He was a Major General and former
Chief Justice of the Kansas Supreme Court. Id. at 218. Chief Justice Rehnquist reports the
date on which Johnson issued the order directing the War Department to set up a commission
for the trial of the conspirators. See REHNQUIST, supra note 139, at 145.
226. See REHNQUIST, supra note 139, at 145. The senior officer on the commission, and
thus its president, was Major General David Hunter. The best known is Major General Lew
Wallace, who gained fame as the author of Ben Hur. id.
227. STEERS, supra note 209, at 213.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 214. A leading historian of the military legal system, Jonathan Lurie, dis-
agrees. He reports that "newspaper commentary reflected a basic mistrust of military commis-
sions." LURIE, supra note 187, at 22.
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New York press joined Bates in denouncing the proceedings.' Critics found
particularly objectionable the fact that they were to be closed to the public."
Under heavy pressure, on May 11 the government opened the trial to news-
paper reporters.'
Secrecy was far from the only problem with this military commission.
As even Steers concedes, "The defendants were at a clear disadvantage in
being tried by military officers, none of whom had served previously as
judges or attorneys." '3 They were also handicapped by the fact that they
were not permitted to testify in their own defense, although they could not
have done that in a civilian court either.' What was unique about this pro-
ceeding was that it "often appeared to be two trials in one."' m The first was a
prosecution of Jefferson Davis and various Confederate agents operating out
of Canada for plotting to kill Lincoln and to do such things as start epidem-
ics on the East CoastY6 As Chief Justice Rehnquist has pointed out, the evi-
dence of these activities and Booth's connections to them at most tended to
establish that he had assassinated the President, something no one disputed;
what the government needed to prove was that the defendants had conspired
with Booth or aided and abetted him.' 7 Besides being highly prejudicial to
the accused, this part of the government's case was based on perjured testi-
mony.
All three of the witnesses it called to prove its contentions lied." The
government's case in the second trial, the one of the eight defendants, was
stronger. Although it may not have established that they conspired to kill
Lincoln, Rehnquist thinks the prosecution proved at least four of them were
guilty of some crime."m The evidence against a fifth, stagehand Edman
Spangler, was a good deal less clear, but if the jury believed one government
witness, it could have found that he made a slight effort to hinder the pursuit
230. See MOORE, supra note 221, at 31.
231. Id at 32. It was Judge Advocate General Holt's idea to keep the proceedings secret.
STEERS, supra note 209, at 222.
232. MooRE, supra note 221, at 32.
233. STEERS, supra note 209, at 222.
234. See REHNQUIST, supra note 139, at 156. In 1864, Maine became the first state to
make defendants in criminal trials fully competent to testify. Over the next twenty years,
every state but Georgia, along with the federal government, followed suit. Id. at 156-57.
235. See STEERS, supra note 209, at 223.
236. See id. at 222-23.
237. See REHNQUiST, supra note 139, at 153-54.
238. See STEERS, supra note 209, at 224-25. One of these witnesses, Sanford Conver,
wound up being sentenced to ten years in the Albany Penitentiary for peIjury. MOORE, supra
note 221, at 32-33.
239. REHNQuiST, supra note 139, at 160-61. Rehnquist thinks Powell (also known as
Lewis Payne) undoubtedly attempted to murder Seward. Harold had been associated with the
conspirators at various times in ways that incriminated him, and he clearly had helped Booth
escape from Washington. Arnold and O'Laughlin had been involved in a conspiracy to kidnap
Lincoln, although they had abandoned the enterprise before the assassination. Id.
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of Booth from Ford's theater." The Chief Justice does not seem to find the
proof against Atzerodt persuasive,"' and he considers "the evidence against
Mudd... too sketchy to have convicted him as a conspirator in the plot to
kill Lincoln."2 '2 Nevertheless, the military commission convicted all of the
defendants, including Atzerodt and Mudd."3 It sentenced the doctor,
O'Laughlin, and Arnold to life in prison and gave Spangler six years in
prison. The commission condemned the other four defendants to death by
hanging.' "
Five of its nine members had reservations about executing Mary Surratt,
but those did not save her from the gallows. Reportedly, when these officers
proposed acquitting Surratt, or at least sparing her life, the Judge Advocate
objected. At the request of one of the wavering members, the Assistant
Judge Advocate drafted for their signature a petition asking President John-
son to commute her sentence to life in prison.2 5 Johnson approved the com-
mission's sentencing recommendations and did not sign the clemency plea.
He claimed later he had never seen it." 6 There is reason to believe that Judge
Advocate General Holt deliberately placed the petition where the President
would be likely to overlook it."7
The execution under such dubious circumstances of a woman who may
have been guilty of nothing more than looking the other way while her son
and his friends plotted criminal activity has helped give the Lincoln Con-
spiracy trial a bad name,24 8 as have other suspicious features of the case. For
example, Secretary of War Stanton helped one of the key witnesses against
Mary Surratt get a government job soon after the trial ended.2 9 A source of
criticism at the time, and since, is the prosecution's failure to introduce
Booth's diary into evidence along with other items taken from his body, an
240. Id. at 162.
241. He summarizes it, but does not include Atzerodt among those he says the govern-
ment proved guilty of some crime. See id. at 155-56, 151-62.
242. Id. at 167.
243. STEERS, supra note 209, at 227.
244. Id.
245. See MOORE, supra note 221, at 105.
246. STEERS, supra note 209, at 226.
247. See MOORE, supra note 221, at 111-12.
248. According to Moore, there was and is a reasonable doubt about whether Mary Sur-
ratt was guilty of conspiring to kill the President. Id. at 105. With respect to the earlier plot to
kidnap Lincoln, he writes,
[T]here is no proof that Mrs. Surratt knew what was being plotted in her boarding-
house.... There is no stronger evidence against her than this: that she suspected
something but could not imagine why strange men kept calling on her son. Her in-
volvement in the abduction plot cannot be more than a guess.
Id. at 100. Chief Justice Rehnquist, on the other hand, believes that "it is difficult to fault the
commission for having found Mary Surratt guilty of conspiracy." REmNQU1ST, supra note 139,
at 165.
249. See MOORE, supra note 221, at 94.
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omission that looks all the more suspicious because there were pages miss-
ing from a document that, even as it stood, would have weakened the gov-
ernment's case.' Finally, there was the fact that this was a military trial of
civilians. In 1990, in a case brought by descendants of Samuel Mudd, the
Army Board for the Correction of Military Records ruled that the Hunter
Commission had been without jurisdiction to try the doctor. By doing so it
had violated his due process rights."' The Board concluded, "Mudd should
have been tried in a civil court and not before a military commission."'
E. The Trial of Captain Henry Wirz
While they considered the trial of the Lincoln conspirators improper,
War Department lawyers in 1865 viewed it as a valuable precedent upon
which they could rely in trying Captain Henry Wirz for the crimes he had al-
legedly committed as commandant of the Confederacy's Andersonville pris-
oner-of-war camp.' To a considerable extent, Wirz was a scapegoat, whose
political trial provided people in the North with an outlet for the anger they
felt over the assassination of Lincoln. Stanton, along with The New York
Times and much of the Northern public, believed not only that Jefferson
Davis and other high Confederate officials were responsible for the Presi-
dent's death, but also that they had conspired to murder Union prisoners of
250. See id. at 72-73; WILAM HANcHmTr, THE LtNcot.N MURDER CossPtRAcEs 85
(1983). According to Hanchett,
[The] revelation that Booth had carried a diary [caused] lasting damage to the
reputations of Stanton, Holt, and Special Judge Advocate [John] Bingham, for it
helped to establish the facts-so scornfully rejected and ridiculed at the 1865 con-
spiracy trial---that there really had been a plot to kidnap Lincoln. and that Booth's
decision to kill was made at the last moment.
Il
251. John W. Dean, Stranger than Fiction, MSNBC, Dec. 15. 2001. available at
http://www.msnbc.connews/672765.asp?cpl+l. The Army rejected the board's recommen-
dation. Although a federal court found the Army had acted arbitrarily and capriciously and
ordered it to address again the board's recommendation, the Army turned that recommenda-
tion down a second time. IAt A federal district judge in Florida had ruled against Mudd him-
self on this issue in the immediate aftermath of the Milligan decision. See Er pare Mudd. 17
F. Cas. 954 (D.D. Fla. 1868) (No. 9,899). See also REHNQUIST, supra note 139. at 168.
252. REHNQUIST, supra note 139, at 168-69.
253. See Laska & Smith, supra note 100, at 95. Between February 1864 and May 1865,
13,000 Union soldiers perished at Andersonville under conditions of "unspeakable squalor."
Id at 78. Hundreds had no shelter, while others lived in patchwork tents or bush huts that did
not keep them dry. Unable to supply its own soldiers adequately, the Confederacy had no
clothing for the prisoners, and many were forced to wear tatters or even nothing at all. Food
was meager and often served raw, and until some prisoners dug their own wells, the only
source of water for the entire camp was a polluted creek filled with waste from the prison
cookhouse and hospital, as well as human excrement. At least 150 captives were shot for al-
legedly trespassing over the "dead line" erected to discourage prisoners from approaching the
walls. Id. at 81-82.
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war.' According to the Secretary of War and Judge Advocate General Holt,
the man who carried this plot into execution was Captain Wirz.2-" The gov-
ernment charged him with conspiring to injure the health and destroy the
lives of prisoners of war and also with murdering thirteen prisoners."6
Murder and conspiracy were, of course, crimes under civilian law, but
Stanton and Holt maintained that because they had been committed in pur-
suit of military objectives, Wirz's offenses were violations of the common
law of war, and hence triable in a military court." The defense insisted that
resort to a military commission was not warranted by martial law, and that
such a body had no authority to try someone who was not a member of the
U.S. armed forces. Although the fighting had ended and the crimes Wirz was
alleged to have committed were cognizable by state and federal courts then
sitting, the commission rejected these arguments."8
The trial the government afforded Wirz was far from fair. The Judge
Advocate, Colonel Norton Chipman, dominated the proceedings, for it was
his job not only to prosecute the defendant, but also to give the commission
"impartial" advice on the correct application of the law. As Lewis Laska and
James M. Smith have written, "It was an immense difficulty, perhaps an in-
superable one, to be the prosecuting officer and the judge at the same
time." '259 Further unbalancing the scales of justice was the fact that two mem-
bers of the commission were friends of Chipman."w Entries in the diary of
one of them, Major General Lew Wallace, who served as president of the
commission, reveal that he was not only prepared to defer without reserva-
tion to the Judge Advocate, but was also biased against the accused."' Dur-
ing the trial, a member of the commission recommended one of the prosecu-
tion's two most important witnesses, who called himself Felix de la Baume,
for a position in the Department of the Interior. Baume, who claimed to be a
Frenchman and the grand-nephew of the Marquis de Lafayette, later turned
out to be an army deserter from New York named Felix Oeser. 62 Chipman's
254. See id. at 132, 83, 89-90. Those with whom Wirz was alleged to have conspired in-
cluded Davis, General Robert E. Lee (commander of the Army of Northern Virginia), and
Major General Howell Cobb (commander of the Department of Georgia), as well as R. R.
Stevenson and Isaiah White, who were surgeons at the prison hospital. Id. at 97.
255. ld. at 90.
256. Id. at 97-98.
257. Id. at 90.
258. See id. at 96. The defense relied on arguments made on behalf of the defendants in
the Lincoln conspiracy trial. In response to its contention that a military commission could not
try a case cognizable in a civilian court because the war was over, prosecutor John 0. Bing-
ham responded that it had not yet ended. It was not until April 2, 1866 that President Johnson
proclaimed the final suppression of the "rebellion" in all of the Southern states except Texas.
Id.
259. Id. at 107.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 106-07. Wallace had also served on the military commission that convicted
the Lincoln conspirators. Id. at 102.
262. See id. at 119, 129-30.
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witnesses often contradicted one another, and some of their testimony was
hearsay.' Few could actually identify the victims of the murders with which
Wirz was charged, and their testimony about those killings was vague."
Nevertheless, the commission found the defendant guilty of all thirteen
homicides, and three more besides, while also convicting him of conspir-
acy.' It condemned Wirz "to be hanged by the neck until dead."2 "Like the
U.S. Dakota trials," writes Peter Maguire, "the trial of Captain Henry Wirz
provided a dramatic spectacle of vengeance. 267 It did not provide a stirring
display of justice.
F. Limitation of Military Tribunals During World War I
Although victimized by procedural unfairness, Henry Wirz was no hero,
and he bore at least some responsibility for the prisoner deaths at Anderson-
ville.2' The perception that most of those punished by military commissions
during the Civil War and Reconstruction deserved their fates probably ac-
counts for the general acceptance of such tribunals, at least outside the
South," during the last decades of the nineteenth century and the early years
of the twentieth. Writing in America's first political science encyclopedia in
1881,7 John W. Clampitt justified the use of military commissions "[w]hen
war prevails in a portion of the country occupied or threatened by an enemy,
whether within or without the territory of the United States ...." But he in-
troduced an important qualification: they should be employed only to try
"crimes and military offenses ... not within the jurisdiction of any existing
civil court."m It is understandable that Clampitt should have taken that posi-
tion, for he had been one of Mary Surratt's defense attorneys.m Excepted
from the jurisdiction of military commissions, he asserted, were "such of-
fenses as are within the legal cognizance of the criminal courts of the coun-
try. .. ."' Henry Winthrop agreed with Clampitt that such crimes were the
263. See i at 118.
264. See id at 118-20.
265. 1& at 126-27.
266. Id at 127.
267. MAGUIME, supra note 101, at 40 (italics in the original omitted).
268. See Laska & Smith, supra note 100, at 131-32. Peter Maguire captures both the jus-
tice of the result and the dubious nature of the proceeding when he declares: "Once again an
especially odious war criminal was singled out for 'summary justice' and the victors were
able to vent their wartime passions in a powerful public display." MAGUlRE, supra note 101,
at 42.
269. The actions of military commissions were a chief complaint of Southerners
throughout the Reconstruction period- I& at 130 n. 183.
270. See NEELY, supra note 95, at 179-80.
271. Id at 179.
272. Id
273. MOoRE, supra note 221, at 37.
274. NEELY, supra note 95, at 180.
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business of the civil courts. In his treatise on military law, Winthrop read
Milligan as establishing that military commissions could take cognizance
only of offenses committed in a theater of war or a place where martial law
or military government could be exercised legally.2"1 'Thus, a commission
ordered by a commander exercising military government, by virtue of his
occupation, by his army, of territory of the enemy, cannot take cognizance of
an offence committed without such territory," Winthrop explained.276
During World War I, there were some who wanted to give military
courts home-front jurisdiction as well. For example, a New York attorney,
Henry W. Forster, argued that "in a national war with a first-class power, it
may not be possible to win the war without court-martialing all enemy spies
and some enemy sympathizers." '277 Brushing aside Milligan as a statutory in-
terpretation case, rather than a constitutional ruling,278 Forster asserted that
during a major war, the Constitution did not "inure to the benefit of the pub-
lic enemy, of spies, or of enemy sympathizers, whether native or foreign. ' '279
Such thinking inspired some extreme nationalists to propose removing sedi-
tion cases from the civil courts and giving them to military tribunals.2"' A
Minnesota judge declared: "What we need is a court that can't be fooled
with a lot of technicality and red tape." He added, "You can't fool a military
court.""28 Attorney General Thomas Gregory heard coming "from every sec-
tion of the country... the cry that the disloyal and seditious should be tried
by military courts-martial and promptly shot.... "282 Although hardly vigor-
ous defenders of civil liberties,283 Gregory and President Woodrow Wilson
opposed what they regarded as constitutionally dubious legislation to author-
ize such trials and managed to head off congressional enactment of the so-
called "court-martial bill."28 '
Wilson also commuted the death sentence imposed by a military court
on an enemy spy, who was apprehended in 1918 trying to sneak into the
United States from Mexico. Although Lothar Witzke was a lieutenant in the
German Navy, when arrested, he was wearing civilian clothes and pretend-
ing to be a Russian-American. A coded note found in his luggage established
conclusively that he was on an espionage mission. Nevertheless, the Presi-
275. WINTHROP, supra note 91, at 836.
276. Id.
277. Henry W. Forster, Are Native American Enemy Sympathizers Subject to Court-
Martial, 85 CENT. L. J. 132, 132 (1917).
278. Id. at 134.
279. Id. at 132.
280. H.C. PETERSON & GILBERT C. FITE, OPPONENTS OF WAR 1917-1918, at 216 (1957).
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. See DAVID M. KENNEDY, OVER HERE: TIE FIRST WORLD WAR AND AMERICAN
SocIETY 80 (1980); DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 267, 360
(1997).
284. KENNEDY, supra note 283, at 80.
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dent spared his life, because the Attorney General advised him that Witzke
should have been tried in a civilian court.'
G. The Nazi Saboteur Case
The next wartime President, Franklin D. Roosevelt, behaved very dif-
ferently when confronted with a similar case.' Roosevelt's immediate reac-
tion, when he learned about the arrest of the Nazi saboteurs who landed on
Long Island and in Florida in June 1942, was that the two who were United
States citizens (Hans Haupt and Ernest Peter Burger) should be tried for
treason by a military court-martial." Rather than attempting to dissuade the
President, his legal advisors encouraged him to hand the job of trying the
saboteurs over to the Army. The Justice Department foresaw both legal and
factual problems if it attempted to prosecute Haupt and Burger for treason,
and, of course, that charge could not be filed against the six defendants who
were unquestionably German nationals.' All eight prisoners could be prose-
cuted in a civilian court for attempted sabotage, but the maximum penalty
for that offense was thirty years in prison.' Secretary of War Henry Stim-
285. See Curry, supra note 91, at 52, 53. Witzke was set free in 1923 as a reward for res-
cuing several fellow inmates from a prison fire. After his return home, the German govern-
ment decorated him with two Iron Crosses. Id.
286. There were actually two military commission trials for offenses committed within
the United States during Roosevelt's presidency. The principal defendant in the other, Wil-
liam Colepaugh, was a Connecticut-born United States citizen, who defected to Germany in
1944 and, after graduation from a German spy school, returned to this country on an espio-
nage mission. In February 1945, Colepaugh was tried along with his German accomplice be-
fore a military commission consisting of seven colonels and majors. It sentenced both of them
to death. See Richard Willing, The Nazi Spy Next Door, USA TODAY, Feb. 28, 2002, avail-
able at http://www.satoday.com/newsnation2002/02/28/usatcov-traitor.htm.
287. Danelski, supra note 71, at 65. One of the arrested saboteurs, Hans Haupt, seems
rather clearly to have been a naturalized United States citizen. See supra note 79. The citizen-
ship status of Ernest Peter Burger was more problematic. After participating in Hitler's Mu-
nich Beer Hall Putsch in 1923, he immigrated to the United States in 1927 and became a natu-
ralized citizen in 1933. Soon after his naturalization, he returned to Germany, where he
became an aide-de-camp to Ernest Reohm, chief of the Nazi Storm Troopers. He subse-
quently became a private in the German army. Danelski, supra note 71, at 62-63. Voluntary
service in a foreign army can result in loss of citizenship. See 8 U.S.C. § 148 1(a)(3). A 1957
Supreme Court decision renders it doubtful, however, whether that can happen automatically.
See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1957). In Trop, the Court declared that so long as a person
"does not voluntarily renounce or abandon his citizenship.., his fundamental right of citizen-
ship is secure." I& at 93. Concurring in that case. Justice Black declared that "[e]ven if citi-
zenship could be involuntarily divested, I do not believe that the power to denationalize may
be placed in the hands of military authorities .... Such forfeiture should not rest on the find-
ings of a military tribunal." Id at 104.
288. Belknap, Supreme Court, supra note 73, at 63. Attorney General Biddle pointed out
to Roosevelt that a treason conviction could be had only upon confession in open court or the
testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act. Besides, there was some evidence that the
two had forfeited their citizenship, and only a citizen could commit treason. Danelski, supra
note 71, at 66.
289. Belknap, Supreme Court, supra note 73, at 63.
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son, who was upset that the saboteurs might be convicted only of a minor of-
fense, expected Attorney General Francis Biddle to fight to retain jurisdic-
tion over them, but to his surprise, Biddle favored trial by a special military
commission? The reason was that he too wanted the defendants punished
more severely than would be possible under civil law. "A Military Commis-
sion is preferable because of the greater flexibility, its traditional use in cases
of this character, and its clear power to impose the death penalty .. .," Biddle
wrote in a June 30, 1942 memorandum to the President."' Roosevelt agreed.
In a "Secret and Confidential" memorandum to Biddle, he declared that the
accused were "just as guilty as it is possible to be" and added, "the death
penalty is called for .... ,2
Biddle's proposal to employ a military commission to secure the execu-
tion of the saboteurs reflected the thinking of Assistant Solicitor General
Oscar Cox, who advised him that "[u]nder the internationally accepted 'law
of war,' apart from our Constitution, enemy aliens or domestic citizens who
came through the lines out of uniform for the purpose of engaging in hostile
acts... are subject to trial by military tribunals."" Cox was aware that in Ex
parte Milligan, the Supreme Court had ruled that such tribunals could not be
used where the civilian courts were open and functioning."" He insisted,
however, that Milligan did not apply to defendants such as these.2" The
saboteurs' army lawyers disagreed. They challenged both the proclamation
that Roosevelt issued on July 2, 1942, denying their clients access to the ci-
vilian courts, and his order appointing a military commission to try them, by
petitioning the Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus.296
The Court sided with the Roosevelt administration. Taking the position
that Milligan did not apply because the petitioners were unlawful belliger-
ents, it held that the acts of which they were accused-entering or remaining
290. Danelski, supra note 71, at 65-66. Lawyers in the Judge Advocate General's office
told Stimson that if the saboteurs were tried in a civil court, they could be convicted of "only
a two-year offense at most." Id. The Justice Department's Boris Bittker apparently agreed
with them. He wrote later:
A military trial would ... make death sentences possible, whereas the most hei-
nous statutory federal crime for which the saboteurs could be prosecuted in the
federal courts was probably conspiracy to commit a federal crime under the gen-
eral conspiracy [section] (§ 371 of Title 18), which at that time carried only a 2-
year sentence.
Bittker, supra note 74, at 434.
291. Memorandum from the Attorney General to the President, (June 30, 1942), OF5036,
Franklin D. Roosevelt Manuscripts [hereinafter FDR MSS], Franklin D. Roosevelt Library,
Hyde Park, New York [hereinafter Roosevelt Library] (copy on file with the Author).
292. Memorandum from FDR to the Attorney General, (June 30, 1942), Box 76, FDR
MSS, supra note 291 (copy on file with the Author).
293. Memorandum from Oscar Cox to the Attorney General, (June 29, 1942), Box 61,
Oscar Cox Papers, Roosevelt Library, supra note 291 (copy on file with the Author).
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. See Belknap, Supreme Court, supra note 73, at 67-69.
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in United States territory out of uniform for the purpose of destroying war
materials and utilities-constituted "an offense against the law of war which
the Constitution authorizes to be tried by military commission."' The Court
also rejected29 the contention of the saboteurs' lawyers "that the President's
order of July 2, 1942, so far as it lays down the procedure to be followed on
the trial before the Commission and on the review of its findings and sen-
tence, and the procedure in fact followed by the Commission, are in conflict
with Articles of War 38, 43, 46, 50 1/2 and 70"of the Article of War.' The
Articles of War was a statute, enacted by Congress, and the defense position
was that, by failing to comply with its procedural requirements, Roosevelt
had violated the law. The Justices agreed unanimously that he had not, but as
Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone acknowledged in his opinion, "a majority
of the full Court are not agreed on the appropriate grounds for decision. '
Some thought Congress had not intended the Articles of War to govern a
presidential military commission convened to try enemy invaders, while oth-
ers, although acknowledging that the Articles of War applied to this case,
took the position that the procedures Roosevelt had adopted were not in con-
flict with the statute."9
The Court had little choice but to reach the conclusion that there had
been no violation of the Articles of War, for by October 29, 1942, when it
published its opinion in Quirin,"2 six of the eight defendants were dead. The
trial, already in progress when defense counsel filed their habeas corpus peti-
tion, adjourned temporarily for the Supreme Court hearing. ' Hence, the Jus-
297. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 46 (1942).
298. Id. at 47. Article 38 authorized the President to prescribe the procedures, including
modes of proof, to be used by military commissions, but required him, insofar as practicable,
to apply the rules of evidence utilized in criminal trials in United States District Courts. Roo-
sevelt's order, on the other hand, made admissible any evidence that would be of "probative
value to a reasonable man." Counsel for the saboteurs also contended it was inconsistent with
Article 38 because that statute directed that "nothing contrary to or inconsistent with these
articles" be prescribed by the President. Article 43 required a unanimous vote for a court mar-
tial to impose a death sentence or to convict anyone of an offense for which execution was
mandatory, and it required a three-fourths vote to impose a prison sentence of more than ten
years. Roosevelt's order, however, authorized the commission to do all of these things by a
two-thirds vote. The attorneys representing the saboteurs also contended it violated Article
70's requirement that there be a thorough and impartial investigation, analogous to a grand
jury hearing, before a case could be brought to trial. The final two articles on which they fo-
cused, Articles 46 and 50 1/2, set forth procedures for appellate review. They required that
every record of trial by a court-martial or military commission be referred by the "convening
authority" (in this case the President) to his staff judge advocate or the Judge Advocate Gen-
eral, and that before the execution of any sentence requiring presidential approval, the record
be examined by a board of review set up by the Judge Advocate General. Roosevelt, however,
had ordered that after the trial of the saboteurs, the trial record be transmitted directly to him
for appropriate action. See Belknap, Supreme Court, supra note 73. at 65, 72.
299. 317 U.S. at 46.
300. Id. at 47.
301. Id.
302- Id. at 1.
303. See Lardner, Nazi Saboteurs Captured, supra note 70, at 23.
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tices were under pressure to render a quick decision, so it could resume.
They did. On July 31, 1942, less than twenty-four hours after the conclusion
of oral argument, the Court issued a terse per curiam opinion, holding simply
that the President possessed the authority to try the saboteurs before a mili-
tary commission, that the one he had created was lawfully constituted, and
that "petitioners ... have not shown cause for being discharged by writ of
habeas corpus.""° The trial resumed on August 1, and on August 3 the com-
mission found all eight defendants guilty and sentenced them to death.31 It
recommended that the death sentences of two of them who had cooperated
with the government be commuted to life in prison."° The others were exe-
cuted in the electric chair of the District of Columbia jail on August 8."
Then the Supreme Court set out to write a full opinion in the Quirin
case. The timing of that enterprise left it with little choice but to resolve, in
his favor, the issue of Roosevelt's alleged failure to comply with the proce-
dural provisions of the Articles of War. In the initial draft per curiam order
that he wrote following oral argument, Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone
stated, with respect to Articles 46 and 50 1/2, that the Court should "not as-
sume in advance that the President would fail to conform his actions to the
statutory requirements. ' When the Court discussed the case in Conference,
however, there was considerable disagreement about whether those articles
even applied to the President. Hence, the Justices decided to delete this sec-
tion.3" By the time he wrote his opinion for the Court, Stone regretted that
action, for it would obviously look bad now to say that the issue had not then
been properly before them."0 Unless they resolved it against the saboteurs,
the Court would be left "in the unenviable position of having stood by and
304. Belknap, Supreme Court, supra note 73, at 76. The Supreme Court's interim per
curian opinion is unpublished. There is a copy in the Ex parte Quirin, July Special Term,
1942 file Ex parte and Miscellaneous Case Files, 1925-1963, Records of the Supreme Court
of the United States, Record Group 267, National Archives, Washington, D.C. Although it
decided Quirin in less than a day, the Supreme Court held two Conferences on the case. See
Danelski, supra note 71, at 71.
305. Belknap, Supreme Court, supra note 73, at 77.
306. Id. The two defendants who had cooperated with the government were George John
Dasch and Ernest Peter Burger. Apparently concluding that they would inevitably be cap-
tured, Dasch and Burger had decided to betray the other saboteurs. Dasch went to the FBI,
disclosed the whole operation, and informed the Bureau that Burger too was willing to turn
himself in. See Danelski, supra note 71, at 64.
307. Belknap, Supreme Court, supra note 73, at 77. After the trial ended, the 3,000-page
record was sent to President Roosevelt for review. After studying it and the findings for two
days, Roosevelt accepted all of the commission's recommendations except that concerning
Dasch; he decided to sentence him to only thirty years in prison. The only "appellate" review
the Saboteur case would receive was conducted by a President who on July 12 had asked
(referring to the defendants), "What should be done with them? Should they be shot or
hanged?" Danelski, supra note 71, at 71. On both August 1 and August 2, Roosevelt told his
secretary he hoped the commission would recommend death by hanging. Id. at 71-72.
308. Danelski, supra note 71, at 71.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 74.
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allowed six men to go to their death without making it plain to all con-
cerned-including the President--that it had left undecided a question on
which counsel strongly relied ... ..3. As Justice Felix Frankfurter pointed
out, saying now that the Court could not decide the issue then because it had
been raised prematurely would make a mockery of justice, and besides, the
surviving saboteurs could force them to decide the question simply by filing
a new habeas corpus petition."2 Stone therefore drafted alternative versions
of this portion of his opinion, about which he himself could say nothing bet-
ter than that they would "present the Court all tenable and pseudo-tenable
bases for decision."3 3 His colleagues found it impossible to unite behind ei-
ther version," ' and in the end opted for announcing that the articles in ques-
tion could "not at any stage of the proceedings afford any basis for issuing
the writ," even though they could not agree among themselves as to why that
was so.
315
The Court also had trouble with the issue of whether it had been consti-
tutional for the President to try the saboteurs before a military commission.
Here the problem was not internal disagreement. When Stone announced in
Conference that, as far as he was concerned, the saboteurs were entitled only
to "executive justice," and, therefore, the military commission had jurisdic-
tion to try them, there was almost no objection."6 The only one of his col-
leagues who seems to have questioned the validity of Roosevelt's proclama-
tion denying the defendants access to the civil courts was Owen Roberts."
Two factors account for this near-unanimity. One is that the Justices
strongly supported the war and wanted to do their part to advance the na-
tional military effort. Indeed, Justice James Byrnes, Jr. "had been a de facto
member of the administration for the past seven months, working closely
with both Biddle and F.D.R. on the war effort.""1' Byrnes would resign from
the Court in October to become Director of Economic Stabilization and later
Director of War Mobilization." ' Justice Frank Murphy was a lieutenant
colonel in the army reserve, who was on maneuvers when he was summoned
back to Washington to hear the Quirin case." Justice Frankfurter (who was
311. Memorandum from H.F.S. [Harlan Fiske Stone] Re Saboteur Cases (Sep. 25. 1942).
Box 68, Harlan Fiske Stone Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington,
D.C. (copy on file with the Author).
312. Danelski, supra note 71, at 75.
313. Id Stone embodied his alternatives in two memoranda. Memorandum A said the
issue was not before the Court. Memorandum B construed the articles in question against the
petitioners' contentions. See id
314. See id. at 78-79.
315. 317 U.S. at 47-48.
316. Danelski, supra note 71, at 71.
317. Id
318. Id at 69.
319. Walter F. Murphy, James F. Byrnes, in 4 THE JUsncES OF "tmE UnrrED STATFs
SUPREME COURT 1277 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds. 1997).
320. Belknap, Supreme Court, supra note 73, at 70. Ironically. Murphy wound up dis-
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Jewish) considered this "a war to save civilization itself from submergence"
and did not want lawyers who were serving in the armed forces asking, "Ha-
ven't we got enough of a job trying to lick the Japs and the Nazis without
having you fellows on the Supreme Court dissipate the thoughts and feelings
and energies of the folks at home by stirring up a nice row as to who has
what power.... ""'
The second factor uniting the Court behind the decision to uphold Roo-
sevelt' s resort to military justice was an unwillingness to challenge the Com-
mander in Chief. Justice Robert Jackson considered the handling of prison-
ers "part of the work of waging war" and thought there were the soundest
reasons why courts should refrain from reviewing presidential orders regard-
ing them. "I think we are exceeding our powers in reviewing the legality of
the President's Order, and that experience shows the judicial system unfitted
to deal with matters in which we must present a united front to a foreign
foe," he wrote to his colleagues. 22 Even if the Court possessed the authority
to hold Roosevelt's military commission unlawful, actually doing so might
be a futile gesture. FDR had told Biddle he wanted it clearly understood that
he was not going to give up the Nazi saboteurs. "I won't hand them over to
any United States marshal armed with a writ of habeas corpus," he said. 3
The Attorney General apparently communicated this information to Justice
Roberts, for when the Court discussed the case in Conference, Roberts told
his colleagues that Biddle feared FDR would execute the saboteurs, regard-
less of what the Court did.3" "That would be a dreadful thing," Stone ex-
claimed.32
Although the Chief Justice and his colleagues readily decided to affirm
the legality of Roosevelt's military commission, writing an opinion that
would justify doing so proved difficult. The problem was a lack of law sup-
porting their position. Stone "began with an essentially intuitive justification
and then asked his law clerks to find authorities to support it."326 His idea
was that this case could be distinguished from Milligan because the petition-
ers were unlawful belligerents, and consequently within the jurisdiction of
military tribunals that the Commander in Chief could set up independently
qualifying himself after Justice Frankfurter, who apparently did not trust the libertarian Mur-
phy to vote the right way, objected to his participation. See Danelski, supra note 71, at 69.
321. Belknap, Supreme Court, supra note 73, at 80. The quoted question is part of a
highly revealing memorandum (most of which is in the form of a hypothetical dialogue be-
tween Justice Frankfurter and the saboteurs) that has been reprinted in its entirety with an edi-
torial introduction as Michal R. Belknap, Frankfurter and the Nazi Saboteurs, 1982 Y.B. Sup.
CT. HIST. Soc. 66.
322. Belknap, Supreme Court, supra note 73, at 79. Jackson's stance in Quirin supports
Jonathan Lurie's contention that far too often civilian courts have responded to announce-
ments of military interests with "supine deference." LURIE, supra note 187, at 8.
323. Danelski, supra note 71, at 68.
324. Id. at 69.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 72.
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of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. "But Stone's clerks could find little au-
thority to support his justification."' Consequently, at almost every crucial
point in his opinion, the Chief Justice found himself forced to cite analogous
cases, rather than ones truly on point.' With respect to its central issue-
whether the use of a military commission to try enemy agents in an area
within the United States where the civilian courts were open and functioning
was constitutional-Exparte Quirin was an exercise in judicial fiat.
Even though the decision was without any real legal foundation, Attor-
ney General Biddle loved it. "Practically .... the Milligan case is out of the
way and should not again plague us," he wrote to Roosevelt the day the Su-
preme Court published its opinion.' In creating an unprincipled exception to
its landmark 1866 ruling, the Court fashioned new law pleasing not only to a
World War II Attorney General, but also to Vice President Dick Cheney.
Quirin is one of the primary precedents Cheney cites to justify the military
commissions President Bush has authorized to try al Qaeda terroristsY
His reliance on Quirin is misplaced, not only because the legal basis of
that decision is nonexistent, but also because of the questionable character of
the proceeding that it upheld. This was a secret trial.3 ' Biddle insisted on ab-
solute secrecy, Stimson reported, because of "particular evidence which was
especially dangerous" that would have to come out during the proceedings.'
That evidence, however, posed less of a threat to national security than to the
reputations of two government agencies.
Following the arrest of all of the would-be saboteurs within two weeks
after the first group splashed ashore on Long Island, the FBI basked in the
warm glow of commendatory publicity. What the public did not know, and
what an open trial would have revealed, is that the Bureau did not deserve
the praise it was receiving. The Long Island team was barely ashore when it
encountered an unarmed Coast Guard beach patrolman, John Cullen. Al-
though its leader, George Dasch, tried to convince Cullen they were fisher-
men who had run aground, he nevertheless insisted they accompany him to a
nearby Coast Guard station. Dasch, saying he did not want to kill him, of-
fered Cullen $260 to forget the encounter. Cullen left, and the four German
agents headed for New York City. There, Dasch told Burger that he had de-
cided to turn the group in, and Burger agreed to go along with his plan.
When Dasch called the local FBI field office, however, the agent who re-
327. Id
328. d
329. Memorandum from Francis Biddle to the President (Oct. 29, 1942), OF5036, FDR
MSS, Roosevelt Library, supra note 29 1.
330. Wallace et al., supra note 6. The other precedent cited by Cheney is the military
commission trial of those accused of conspiring to assassinate Abraham Lincoln. Id
331. The 1945 military commission trial of William Colepaugh was also held in secret.
The courtroom was closed to the public, and an Army information officer briefed the press
twice daily. Willing, supra note 286.
332. Danelski, supra note 71, at 66.
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corded his message took no action beyond simply filing what he dismissed
as a crank call. Dasch, believing he had paved the way for a meeting with the
Bureau's director, J. Edgar Hoover, took a train to Washington, D.C., where
he received a somewhat skeptical reception. He nevertheless made a 254-
page typed confession and turned over more than $82,000 in $50 bills. Util-
izing information supplied by Dasch, the invisible writing on a handkerchief
he gave them, and some help from Burger, FBI agents tracked down most of
the saboteurs.333 The Bureau arrested Haupt when he walked into its Chicago
office in a bold attempt to clear himself of draft evasion charges. 3' The
FBI's publicity-seeking Director Hoover hurried from Washington to New
York to announce the capture.333 Americans, starved for good news about a
war that so far had been going badly, went wild, reacting as if the country
had just won a major military victory.336 According to Biddle, it was gener-
ally believed that a particularly brilliant FBI agent, probably by attending the
sabotage school where the eight Nazi agents trained, had been able to get on
the inside and make regular reports to America.337 Of course, that was non-
sense, but Hoover did not bother to correct such convenient mis-impressions.
Indeed, according to testimony given during the saboteurs' secret military
trial by Agent Norvel D. Willis, FBI officials had offered to arrange a presi-
dential pardon for Dasch if he would plead guilty and not testify about his
role in the apprehension of his confederates.338 Had the trial been public, the
feverish adulation the Bureau was receiving would have cooled considera-
bly, for it would have revealed that in the saboteur case, the Bureau had been
more blundering than brilliant.
A public trial would also have damaged the reputation of the Coast
Guard. Cullen took Dasch's $260 and left the saboteurs on the beach be-
cause he was not in a position to apprehend them. He had no weapon. Al-
though the nation had been at war for six months, the Coast Guard was still
using unarmed beach patrols on Long Island.339 Cullen did the best he could,
which was run to his station, where he reported his encounter with the Ger-
mans and turned in the money Dasch had given him. By daybreak, the Coast
Guard had unearthed the military uniforms and explosives the saboteurs had
buried on the beach. Inexplicably, however, it waited until 11:00 a.m. to in-
333. Lardner, Nazi Saboteurs Captured, supra note 70, at 14-15.
334. Belknap, Supreme Court, supra note 73, at 62.
335. See Lardner, Nazi Saboteurs Captured, supra note 70, at 15. Hoover and the FBI
had been actively seeking favorable publicity ever since agents, led by Melvin Purvis, gunned
down gangster John Dillinger outside a Chicago theater in 1934. See KENNETH O'REILLY,
HOOVER AND THE UN-AMERICANS: THE FBI, HUAC AND THE RED MENACE 26-34 (1983). By
1938, Attorney General Homer Cummings had become so concerned about the Bureau's pub-
licity activities that he ordered Hoover to limit them. Id. at 34. Nevertheless, "The Bureau
maintained its high-powered, high-profile self-promotion work in the years to come .. " Id.
336. Belknap, Supreme Court, supra note 73, at 62.
337. Lardner, Nazi Saboteurs Captured, supra note 70, at 15.
338. Belknap, Supreme Court, supra note 73, at 67.
339. Id.
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form the FBI. By then the Nazi agents, already on their way to Manhattan,
were buying fresh clothes in Jamaica, Queens.' This display of ineptitude
certainly would not have endeared the Coast Guard to the voters and taxpay-
ers of a nation at war.
IV. CONCLUSION
The sort of concealment that enabled the FBI and the Coast Guard to
avoid responsibility for their mistakes in the Nazi saboteur case might or
might not recur as a result of Bush's resort to military commissions. The
procedural rules issued by the Pentagon make it unclear how open the pro-
ceedings of these tribunals are going to be.' Democracy depends on open-
ness, while secrecy is the friend of politicians and bureaucrats who wish to
avoid accountability. The possibility that military commissions established
to try alien members of al Qaeda might be misused to hide from American
citizens information that they need to monitor and control their own gov-
ernment is reason enough to be skeptical about the Bush Administration's
plans. It suggests that, even if these tribunals are legal, using them to fight
terrorism on the home front would be unwise. Military commissions may be
necessary to deal with enemy war criminals captured abroad. As instruments
340. Lardner, Nazi Saboteurs Captured, supra note 70. at 14.
341. Section 5(0) of the procedural rules released by the Pentagon on March 21. 2002
provides: "The accused shall be afforded a trail open to the public (except proceedings closed
by the Presiding Officer, consistent with Section 6(B)." Department of Defense, supra note
43. Section 6(B)(3) provides that the Commission shall:
Hold open proceedings except where otherwise decided by the Appointing Author-
ity [the Secretary of Defense or his designee] or the Presiding Officer in accor-
dance with the President's Military Order and this Order. Grounds for closure in-
clude the protection of information classified or classifiable under reference (d);
information protected by law or rule from unauthorized disclosure; the physical
safety of participants in Commission proceedings, including prospective witnesses;
intelligence and law enforcement sources, methods, or activities: and other na-
tional security interests. The Presiding Officer may decide to close all or part of a
proceeding on the Presiding Officer's own initiative or based upon a presentation.
including an ex pane, in camera presentation by either the Prosecution or the De-
fense. A decision to close a proceeding or portion thereof may include a decision
to exclude the Accused, Civilian Defense Counsel, or any other person, but De-
tailed Defense Counsel [an appointed military lawyer] may not be excluded from
any trial proceeding or portion thereof.... Open proceedings may include, at the
discretion of the Appointing Authority, attendance by the public and accredited
press, and public release of transcripts at the appropriate time. Proceedings should
be open to the maximum extent practicable. Photography, video, or audio broad-
casting, or recording of or at Commission proceedings shall be prohibited, except
photography, video, and audio recording by the Commission pursuant to the direc-
tion of the Presiding Officer as necessary for preservation of the record of trial.
Id Reference (d) refers to Executive Order 12958, "Classified National Security Informa-
tion," (Apr. 17, 1995), as amended, or any successor Executive Order. See id. at "Refer-
ences."
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for punishing crimes committed within the United States that could be
prosecuted in this country's civilian courts, however, they are badly flawed.
As we have seen, the history of American military commissions is not a
happy one. Far too often, the principal reason for employing them has been
political. Far too often, they have been utilized because they could be
counted on not only to impose harsher penalties than the civilian courts but
also to return convictions more easily and on the basis of less evidence. Far
too often, their proceedings have been marred by gross procedural irregulari-
ties, perjury, and corruption. During World War I, America wisely resisted
subjecting those who were not members of the armed forces to military jus-
tice. Our generation should follow the example of that one. Military com-
missions are a facet of America's legal heritage that should not be part of its
legal future. Their tainted history suggests that they can only tarnish a just
war on terrorism.
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